

THE FORTNIGHTLY

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THE FUTURE OF GERMANY

BY THE ARCHBISHOP OF YORK

There can be no doubt that P.E.P. has rendered a great service in putting forward a realistic sketch of the chief problem that will confront us after we have won the war, and the discussion which has ensued in these pages has been of precisely the kind required to carry forward the purpose of the broadsheet issued by P.E.P.—the stimulation of serious and balanced thought exercised upon a probable forecast of the facts.

I.

It is of course important to remember that a “probable forecast” is all that can be expected. This does not make it less desirable to form opinions about the future; but it does impress upon us the necessity of holding these opinions with some measure of elasticity, so that they may be adjusted to the actual facts so far as these turn out to be other than had been anticipated.

There are at least three ways in which peace may come:

- (1). There might be a complete defeat of the German armies so that they were really disintegrated.
- (2). There might be a collapse of *morale* on the German home front, so that the armies had to surrender because they were no longer supplied with food and ammunition.
- (3). There might be a revolt against the Nazi régime which put the army itself in control of the situation, followed by an offer of such peace terms as the allies would think it right to accept.

(1) In the event of a total German defeat, there would be, as the P.E.P. broadsheet pointed out, no ordered German state left. The Nazis have made a clean sweep of the old organs of Government and administration. It would be necessary to create an administrative machine and to supply a police force, which must of necessity be military, to uphold it while it gained effective authority. This involves a particular kind of military occupation. It is legitimate to hope, but hardly legitimate to expect, that this would be rendered more palatable to the German people by the fact that they are likely, in the event of

complete defeat, to stand in need of protection from their own neighbours on east and west alike. One of the dismaying factors in the situation is the vast mountain of hatred which German conduct is heaping up to ever greater heights in nearly every European country. At present we are less affected in this way than most of our allies; for we have not been under the oppressor's heel; and in any case our insular position has enabled us to acquire a temperament and establish a tradition which is averse from long-continued vindictiveness. This may make it possible for us to uphold order in Europe while immediate physical needs are satisfied and plans for a lasting settlement are worked out. The main point for the moment is that a complete German defeat would almost certainly involve us in the sheer necessity of a military occupation of Germany for a considerable time.

(2) The second possibility mentioned above is that of a collapse of German *morale* leading to the surrender of the armies through lack of support from home. This would be in effect similar to (1), because the surrender of the army would deprive it of all power to be itself the source of order, and the moral collapse necessary to produce this result would bring with it the same internal chaos as military defeat. Consequently this situation also would call for a military occupation of Germany for police and defensive purposes, though, if it could be arranged (as is very doubtful) contingents from the German army could be used for part of the task.

(3) The third possibility opens up an entirely different set of considerations. This possibility consists of a revolt of the army itself against the Nazi government and party, an orderly withdrawal of all armed forces within the frontiers of the *Reich*, and then an offer of peace by negotiation.

At first sight it would seem that such an offer should be welcomed; but at least certain conditions would be required. Let us suppose however that the frontiers of the *Reich* are understood as the frontiers of 1919, so as to put the matter in the most favourable light that is possible. What should be our response then? Our first duty would be to consult the Poles, Czechs, Danes, Dutch, Belgians, French and Norwegians. We need not, perhaps, hold ourselves bound to carry them with us completely in our policy; but they, and not the citizens of Great Britain, are the people primarily concerned. They would inevitably say something like this: "Geography and History present us with a situation in which even though we hold together in support of one another, as we did not before 1938

and 1939, yet we can have no sense of safety while Germany remains heavily armed. We must demand the effective disarmament of Germany." But if Germany is thus disarmed, the situation already contemplated again confronts us. For if the Government is dissolved and the army is deprived of its power, we and our allies must supply the force necessary for defence and order; and so we come back to a period of military occupation.

I take it for granted that some sort of administrative machinery would be established, based on traditional German institutions; and these would need a central organ subject to the occupying power or powers. But this does not seem to me a point of major importance. The dominant fact will be that of military occupation.

II.

We ought to be ready to face two main sets of consideration; unfortunately very many people face only one of these. One is the growth of facts represented by the phrase "The Prussian Tradition"; the other is the impossibility and moral hideousness of an attempt permanently to coerce a great people.

(1) Lord Vansittart has made plain enough what the Prussian tradition is. I wish he had left out Tacitus, who was as censorious towards our progenitors as towards those of the Nazis. His presentation suggests that Prussianism is something biological—something inherited by physical transmission. That is merely the Nazi heresy read backwards. What confronts us is a social, not a biological, inheritance; and it is therefore alterable by the appropriate social influences. To that we shall return; the first need is to recognize this social inheritance as a fact of grim reality and stupendous importance. We ought to be sincerely grateful to Lord Vansittart for making this abundantly plain. But though he has done this most effectively, I propose to recall the salient factors of the tradition as seen from my own angle of approach.

Prussia is the only instance in the modern world of an army which has expanded itself into a state. Elsewhere we have nations which organized states and employed armies; here is an army which became a state. For the ancestor of the Prussia of Frederick the Great and of Bismarck is the Order of Teutonic Knights. At the end of the fourteenth century this Order ruled over an extensive area which they had conquered in a war which, even among crusades, was conspicuous for its barbarity. The spread of Reformation principles and the rise of the power

of Poland undermined the prestige and authority of the Order. At last a Grand Master secularized it, and at his death the Duchy of Prussia was united with the Mark of Brandenburg, itself a state based on conquest and the subjugation of Slavonic tribes.

There was little of Christianity in this religious Order. Its language was used, but the spirit was that of Sparta; and the subjugated tribes were in some cases forced into a nominal Christianity as late as the end of the fourteenth century. Now 1400 A.D. is nearer in time to 1940 than it is to 597 when Augustine landed in Kent or to 635 when Aidan came to Iona. Moreover soon after the establishment of a nominal Christianity in those north-eastern provinces, all Germany was thrown into the turmoil of the Reformation and the desolations of the Thirty Years War. Prussia proper had little chance to become imbued with Christian principles. Her conversion was incomplete; it did not penetrate to the sub-conscious. Of course this is true in some measure of us all, but the divided soul of Prussia was a very potent fact; Wotan was suppressed, not eliminated.

This militarist tradition was used by Frederick William I., the first conscious "totalitarian," though he did not use that word, to forge the weapon which Frederick the Great would use. Frederick used it in the true Hitlerian spirit, as when he took care that his declaration of war on Maria Theresa should arrive after he had seized her frontier-fortresses. It is hard for a people, whose imperial greatness actually rests on the exclusion of ethics from politics, readily to accept the view that policy should be ethically determined. There are dark pages in our own imperial history, but none that presents to us so great an obstacle to a moral judgment upon policy as the career and historical significance of Frederick created for the modern patriotic German.

Such historical facts are of supreme importance. We cannot often enough recall the penetrating words of Lord Acton in his lecture on *Peter the Great and the Rise of Prussia*, delivered near the end of the last century, where he speaks of the political faith which inspired the founders of modern Tzarist Russia and modern Germany:

Government so understood is the intellectual guide of the nation, the promoter of wealth, the teacher of knowledge, the guardian of morality, the mainspring of the ascending movement of man. That is the tremendous power, supported by millions of bayonets, which grew up . . . at Petersburg, and was developed, by much abler minds, chiefly in Berlin; and it is the greatest danger that remains to be encountered by the Anglo-Saxon race.

It is unnecessary to repeat the story which tells how, under Bismarck, Prussia gained domination of the soul and body of Germany. Hitler is the naked expression of that bad tradition in all its power and hideousness.

Such a history cannot be ignored. Europe can never be safe till the Prussian tradition is exorcized and a generation arises in Germany which is free from it. Our aim must be the conversion and re-education of the German people. This cannot be done by force. But in the judgment of very many, of whom I am one, a complete manifest and continuing demonstration of the failure of the Prussian enterprise is a necessary preliminary. Questions about collective, as distinct from individual, psychology are here involved. An individual may be converted by a sacrificial act prompted by love; a nation, though it consists of individuals, cannot be thus turned from an egoistic ambition, because its citizens exhaust their capacity for generous response by the offering of their lives to their nation in service of its egoistic aim. Whatever may be true of individuals severally, those same individuals acting collectively will be turned from their self-assertiveness only by its total failure.

Consequently we should on moral grounds by no means refuse, but rather welcome, the necessity on political grounds for a military occupation of Germany. It is the one and only possible method of bringing home to the soul of Germany the completeness of its failure.

(2) But this can be undertaken rightly, and without creating a resentment bound to result in another outbreak, if it is undertaken in a spirit of true justice and without any exploitation of the situation to the advantage of the victorious powers. We must establish order in Germany and security for Germany. The fact that we have to do this will be a bitter humiliation. Nothing must be done which has further humiliation as its object, and everything must be done to stress that for a Germany which acts as a good neighbour there is open as good a life as for any people on earth.

III.

Here it is most important to observe that in a national settlement no penal provisions can be both lasting and just. A rising generation will rightly resent as unjust whatever conditions are imposed upon it as punishment for the offences of former generations. All thoughts of punishment of a nation involve a personification of the nation far beyond the facts.

It is one thing to follow a policy which is in fact disagreeable to Germans in the interest of order and security; it is quite another thing to follow that same policy with the object of being disagreeable to Germans. We must be quite clear about our intention; this will govern the spirit of our action. A military occupation can have very various flavours for the inhabitants of a country, as was proved by the difference perceptible in the various centres of occupation after the last war. Our forces must be in Germany as protectors of the peace of Europe, not as gaolers of Germany herself. Their mere presence will do more than is needed in that respect. Their business is to prevent explosions while reconstruction begins.

IV.

I am convinced that the P.E.P. authors are right in urging as a primary objective the "divorce of national structures from military and economic power." The national structure should have an administrative and cultural aim; power should, so far as possible, be subject to international control.

At Versailles the settlement was politically generous and economically severe; that was topsy-turvy; we must be politically firm even if this involves severity, and economically egalitarian, which is, in view of German conduct, a form of generosity.

Moreover the economic settlement should be undertaken first, while order is maintained through military occupation. The most urgent of all matters will be the feeding of Europe, including Germany, and the restarting of industry. A Reconstruction Commission should be set up at once, to work by means of those controls which Britain and the United States will have in respect of all raw materials imported from overseas.

This Reconstruction Committee must pay special attention to the centres of heavy industry. War potential is as important as war equipment. It will be futile to disarm Germany if her exclusive control of the resources of the Ruhr leaves her free to re-arm at lightning speed. Such areas must be developed under international control, whether capitalist or, as I should prefer, entrusted to chartered Guilds. In such an arrangement there must be no anti-German bias, except so far as the German claim to exclusive control must be disallowed. In this as in all else it must be clear that service of the general welfare is the governing principle. Let it be evident to all that the necessary physical welfare of all is being secured to the utmost possible extent. This must go forward under British

and American supervision, though the assistance of all allied countries and, from an early date, of Germany also must be obtained. Such a common enterprise will give psychological preparation for the political task to follow.

Here I find myself in partial agreement with P.E.P. and its advocacy of "Commonwealth" methods on the one hand, and with advocates of a formal Association of Nations on the other. I hope it may be found possible to carry on for a few years—five at the least—under British-American guidance with allied help, before any formal political action is taken. Of course provisional frontiers must be drawn, so that the administrative machines may function. But these should at first be provisional only. And wherever possible the units of economic administration should overlap frontiers, so that these would become less prominent in men's thoughts, and the exclusive aspects of nationalism would fade out. Power throughout this period should be British-American on the West and Russo-Chinese in the East. But there must be the clear intention of letting this power pass to the control of the international authority as that is built up.

During this period there will be a free association of the allied nations, Germany also taking some part from the beginning, after the analogy of the British Commonwealth. But I am sure that Professor Gilbert Murray* and Lord Cecil* are right when they urge that this analogy will be found a false guide to the permanent relationship of nations different from one another in a thousand ways and some of them lately engaged in deadly war with one another. There must be some permanent constitution for Europe. But it will be far better if this can grow rather than be manufactured. Therefore I hope that about five years after the cessation of hostilities a Congress of European nations will be assembled, with American and Chinese assessors, to work out by degrees the political problems of Europe, and with the hope that it may itself, with needed modifications, become in effect and, at last (perhaps fifty years later) by full right the federal Council of a united Europe.

There would still be need for the League of Nations, consisting of all nations of the world who are willing to join. It would carry on its excellent social and medical work; it would be a forum of international discussion; and it would be the focus of the moral judgment of the civilized world. But Europe is

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a separate and special problem, for which a separate and special solution must be found.

If the Congress could itself grow into the Federal Council, many difficulties would be avoided. There would be no definitive peace-settlement which could hardly be modified without a threat of war, but, instead, a continuous adjustment until the actual authority of the Congress was taken for granted and it could become the Federal Council. Of course it must develop a constitution for this purpose, with rules about representation of majorities and minorities. At a certain far distant stage the Federation could be formally inaugurated, and the new era regarded as established.

V.

A great deal of this sketch is speculative and is offered rather as illustrating a spirit and a method than as a programme for action. But it all turns on the readiness of Great Britain and the United States to shoulder the burden.

Our chief request of the United States will be co-operation in maintaining the economic controls and supplies necessary for bringing the new co-operative Commonwealth of Europe into being. Here one can do no more than express the hope that the citizens of the United States will be ready for so much share in maintaining the peace and prosperity of the world.

Will Great Britain be ready to accept the responsibility involved in victory? We shall be very tired; the tendency to relaxation incidental to fatigue will be very strong; we shall be sorely tempted once more to withdraw from Europe and leave the small nations to their fate. But that must not happen. It would be a betrayal of singular baseness. If we are right to be fighting now, the same duty will keep us heavily armed and ready to carry through the protective-preventive occupation of Germany until a genuine settlement is reached of such a kind that aggression by any one nation is impossible.

VI.

Nearly always the difficulty of the Christian way consists in the need to combine two or more qualities which are fairly easy to maintain in separation. Thus in the stock instance, it is quite easy to be genial with all men if there is no attempt to uphold a moral standard; that is being a libertine. And it is fairly easy to uphold a moral standard if you let yourself become hard, censorious and unsympathetic; that is being a Pharisee. But it is very hard to uphold for yourself and others

a high moral standard and still be so sympathetic to sinners that they come to you as their friend; that is being a good Christian.

So it is here. It will be quite easy to give rein to our passions for a while and impose a vindictive peace. It will be fairly easy to be indolently generous, sinking into a mood of selfish relaxation while we talk piously about forgiving those who injure us. (But they have not injured us very much as compared with what they have done to others. I notice some people who are always repenting of their fathers' sins and forgiving Germans the injuries done to Czechs and Poles; and I am not impressed). The course to which we are called is far harder. It is to carry the burden of securing the restored peace of Europe by disarming Germany, remaining armed ourselves, and effecting a military occupation of at least key points in Germany: but to do this without exploiting that situation to our own advantage, and steadily handing over to an international authority the control which we shall have won and exercised.

That, as I think, is the Christian line of action in such a situation as that which our victory will create. On the question whether we are sufficiently Christian to follow it the welfare of the world in the next century may hang.

PLANNING POST-WAR EUROPE

IV. BRITAIN'S PART

Prepared in co-operation with the Belgian, Polish and Czechoslovakian authorities by J. Emlyn Williams

THE competent representatives of Belgian, Polish and Czechoslovak circles in London to-day who here express their opinion on the rôle of Great Britain in post-war Europe emphasize that this country—as well as the United States of America and Soviet Russia—must actively participate in the work of reconstruction, if it is to be permanent.

Each of them admits that British interest in the affairs of his country when this war is over, should not be merely financial or economic but political also. This does not, of course, mean active participation—a state of affairs, as Belgium rightly points out, which would simply lead to an anti-British reaction later. But it does mean that Britain should abandon once and for all any idea of leaving Europe to its own devices and should throw in the weight of its political experience, as well as its financial resources on the side of order and social progress throughout the Continent. British co-operation, in Polish eyes, should go as far as large-scale guidance in political, economic and social fields. The Czechoslovak statement emphasizes the fact that Britain will enter the post-war period with a prestige no nation before it ever enjoyed on the Continent and there must be no return to “splendid isolation” if for no other reason than that European security and Britain's security are inevitably bound up together.

To the Britisher, these expressions of authoritative—if not official—opinion stress the great opportunity and heavy responsibility which it is felt will be at this country's door when the war is over.

Here, in a very practical way, is the answer to the criticisms that have been levelled at the neutrality policy which some of these states followed until Germany invaded them. They admit that this policy is now out of date and that the demands for limitation of state sovereignty are essential for peace and

progress. But, at the same time, they ask where then is their new guarantee of security?

British failure to act at the time of the German occupation of the Rhineland, in 1936, was to these states the clearest indication of this country's failure to appreciate what was then happening East of the Rhine; and the Chamberlain policy towards the Third *Reich* and to Czechoslovakia, in particular, was taken as conclusive proof of the rightness of that standpoint and of the necessity for smaller nations to make whatever agreements they could with Germany for their own protection.

These three statements all show plainly that Britain's leadership and continued co-operation will mean much for the success of post-war Europe.

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When we have won the war, we shall have to win the peace. The latter task will not be less arduous than the former and will certainly require exceptional effort from all

Belgium of us.

Much will depend upon Great Britain's attitude. If Britain goes back to "splendid isolation" even under the new formula of a so-called *bloc anglo-saxon* or *bloc anglo-americain*, the world will once again miss its chance of a real peace settlement. If on the other hand Britain were to become excessively interventionist then an anti-British reaction might easily develop on the Continent. A middle way must therefore be found between these two extremes. It should be based upon solidarity and determined but tactful participation, without giving the impression of compulsion. There are fortunately reassuring signs that such a solution is both desired and sought by the British authorities concerned.

The rôle of a democratic and victorious Britain towards any state on the Continent can be considered in relation to that country's problems of frontiers, internal politics, international relations and economics and finance. If we examine possible future relations between this country and Belgium under these four aspects we find that there are no serious difficulties standing in the way of the closest co-operation between them.

As to the question of frontiers Belgium's only outstanding problem before the German invasion was that of Eupen-Malmedy, a small territory mainly consisting of a few thousand acres of woodland and without great economic importance. This issue should present no difficulties.

Belgium's internal politics will also give little trouble. A democracy and strong supporter of social progress, Belgium

has had very much in common with Britain. The Belgian Constitution of 1830 was largely inspired by the principles of British parliamentarianism. The majority of Belgians desire the restoration of these principles, and any modifications will only be towards greater democracy and increased social progress. In this sphere the example of Great Britain should greatly influence Belgium just as the influence and repercussion of the Second French Republic of 1848 influenced many Continental countries a century ago.

It is of course in the matter of international relations that Belgium's attitude will be most directly affected by what Britain does. Is it necessary to recall that the policy of neutrality adopted by Belgium in 1936 mainly arose from a feeling of deception—when a small country, after long and loyal support of the League of Nations and of "collective security," saw the German storm troops crossing the Rhine bridgeheads and reaching its frontiers without "halt" being cried by its former allies? Britain's part in this decisive development completed Belgium's disillusionment regarding the maintenance of peace through collective co-operation.

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As has been shown in previous articles, the consolidation of Eastern and Central Europe is an essential element in the preservation of European security—in holding the balance between Germany and Russia. As such it is a matter of vital concern to Great Britain. A policy of isolationism towards the European continent, and especially towards Eastern and Central Europe would not be in keeping with British interests, for it would bring that area once more under the sway of one great continental power. This contention has been justified by events leading up to the present war. It is therefore the view of Polish circles that Britain, backed by the British Commonwealth of Nations, and the U.S.A., should take an active part in post-war developments, affecting this part of Europe.

Defence measures should be co-ordinated. They should include British occupation of naval and air bases on the shores of the Baltic, and permanent British control of the sea routes, connecting this region with the British Isles.

Britain should occupy a central position in all international organizations set up for the purpose of giving first aid to devastated areas, expediting reconstruction work, carrying out large-scale economic plans, etc.

PLANNING POST-WAR EUROPE

Within the limits of these plans, Britain should substantially develop her commercial and financial relations with Eastern and Central Europe, in contrast with the pre-war period, when the flow of British goods and capital was mainly directed to Western Europe and Germany. Eastern and Central Europe should replace Germany as the supplier of raw materials, machinery, equipment, etc., for Britain, and so put an end to German economic expansion in this area. In 1938, Germany's share in the total imports of Yugoslavia was 48 per cent., Britain's 5 per cent.: 49 per cent. of Hungary's imports came from Germany, 5 per cent from Britain: the corresponding figures for Rumania were, Germany 15 per cent., Britain 6 per cent. and for Poland: Germany 15 per cent., Britain 12 per cent.

These export transactions will have to be largely carried out on a credit basis. This should not be difficult. It could follow the lines laid down in the recent treaties between Great Britain and Turkey, and between the U.S.A. and China. These agreements provide for deferred payment for goods delivered to be effected in kind by the debtor countries.

In this connection, it is interesting to note the amount of British capital invested in Polish banks, insurance companies, chemical works, shipping enterprises, and electrical power undertakings. In the last mentioned, £3,600,000 were invested between 1923 and 1936. Credits were granted to Polish industries, sugar, etc., by British capital, in connection with Polish overseas exports. In addition, certain Polish railway electrification and telephone extension schemes were actively supported by British finance, partly through the medium of the Export Credits Guarantee Department.

Banking activities after the war will have to be adapted to the general trend of planned economy, aimed at making Eastern and Central Europe capable of independent political and economic life, as distinct from the rôle assigned to it by Hitler of becoming a passive adjunct to a self-sufficient Greater Germany.

As there is little chance of the gold standard being re-established during the immediate post-war years, the conclusion of currency agreements between groups of inter-allied states may perhaps prove to be the most practical solution. Such agreements could provide for closer relations between member states of the same group, whilst the ties connecting the various groups with one another might be somewhat looser.

In principle, the countries of Eastern and Central Europe

should belong to the "sterling bloc." The currency and credit policies of each of these countries should be clearly defined within the framework of a general co-ordinated plan. Since the leading part in this bloc would fall to Britain, it would naturally reap the benefit of expanding markets. At the same time, Britain would be directly interested in the development of the natural resources of these countries by supplying them with the means of achieving economic progress in the form of credits, investments, etc.

The whole credit and banking systems of Eastern and Central Europe would have to be readjusted with a view to adapting it to that of the Anglo-American world, with which it will be called upon to co-operate. Already, before the war, a number of leading Polish banks closely collaborated with British financial institutes, especially in the sphere of commercial credits, cotton, sugar, timber, etc. Polish government bonds and other securities were placed regularly on the London market.

Large scale guidance in the political, economic and social fields is what the nations of Eastern and Central Europe expect from Britain on the victorious conclusion of the war.

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Master John Huss, Father of the Czechoslovak Reformation, and warm admirer of Wycliffe, speaks in one of his letters of **Czecho-**
slovakia *benedicta Anglia*,—"the blessed land of England." And this was how the whole Czechoslovak nation regarded England five hundred years ago. This, too, was how we looked at her when we saw her tenacity, endurance and self-sacrifice during the World War, at the close of which her statesmen showed such understanding for the ideal of liberating the small nations, and for democratic co-operation by all states of the world. Of recent years, however, British policy has not always been of the kind to call forth our admiration or even our agreement. There was certainly not one Czechoslovak who would have spoken of the "blessed land of England" during the time of the Munich crisis.

Great Britain and the whole world are to-day paying a heavy price for the unbelievable short-sightedness of their leading politicians of the last twenty years. What Britain and her allies are now doing in the common struggle for the liberation of Europe and the victory of democracy will earn them in Europe, and particularly in Czechoslovakia, that well-deserved

title John Huss gave them more than five hundred years ago. Great Britain will enter the post-war period with a prestige which no nation before it has ever had on the Continent. In Central Europe no one thinks of holding against the Britain of Churchill and Eden the mistakes of the Britain of Chamberlain and Runciman.

The Atlantic Charter seems to guarantee that one of Britain's mistakes after the last war shall not recur. Great Britain and the U.S.A. have undertaken not to turn away from Europe, the moment arms are laid down; but to accept common responsibility for building up Europe in such a way as to make a third world war impossible in the near future. Its experience in this war should have taught Britain that every question of *European* security is at the same time a question of *its own* security. Britain's frontiers are now not the Rhine, but the Urals, and everything that takes place between the Urals and the Atlantic is of vital importance to this country. The question as to whether Great Britain is a European power, or a naval power, the centre of an Empire extended throughout the world, has been decided by this war. Great Britain is both, and her naval interests are directly bound up with her position in Europe.

What will be Britain's part in the future life of Europe as a whole, and of Central Europe in particular? Let us differentiate between the urgent immediate post-war needs, which will last for a short period, and the more lasting needs, arising out of the new organization of the Continent.

Immediate needs will be economical and political. Great Britain and the other parts of the British Commonwealth will be in possession of large economic resources,—of raw materials, foodstuffs, etc.—with which to relieve the terrible economic hardships of the countries plundered by the Germans. By doing this she will already have made great strides in the building of a new Europe. There is little point in making great plans in the distant future, if help cannot be given to the populations in the years immediately ahead so as to rebuild those lands which will have been made economic deserts.

Britain's political task in co-operation with the other victors, particularly with Soviet Russia, will be to keep order in Central Europe after the German collapse, and to act as adviser to the nations, which will be busy on reconstruction work.

The occupation of Germany for a transition period, at least, will be essential—essential both for the victors, who cannot this time rely on mere German promises, as in 1918, and for the

Germans themselves, since it can hardly be expected that Germany, after a military collapse, will be able swiftly to restore and maintain order at home.

As far as Central Europe is concerned, all the problems of frontier will remain open. Great Britain could exert a beneficial influence on these problems. Czechoslovakia will no longer be to her a "distant land about which she knows nothing," as it was to Mr. Chamberlain; and other Central European states will be to Britain much more concrete geographical and political conceptions than they were before the war. Their state organizations, security, strategic defence, etc., will be very real questions for this country in the future. Political, economic and other specialists will, we hope, be welcome collaborators of the responsible statesmen of the re-established states in their enormous task of reconstruction.

But by far the greatest and most responsible task will be England's permanent part in maintaining and perfecting the new order, which will thus arise. The European Statute, which was laid down in Versailles, had a short life, mainly because Russia took no part in it, and because the Anglo-Saxon world, America immediately and openly, and Great Britain, gradually and with reservations, turned away from it. The burden of maintaining it rested for twenty years on France and on the little Entente. It is unnecessary to seek exonerating circumstances for the French policy of weakness after the death of Barthou; but it is not excluded that France might have followed a different policy, had she felt that Great Britain was strongly and actively behind her in supporting the Versailles *status quo*. After the war, for the first time in living memory the three great peace-loving states of Europe will have an identical interest. The peace that will come out of the future peace conference should be the common work of the Anglo-Saxons, Russians, French and of the medium and small nations of Europe.

Great Britain, which is the mother country of a remarkable international organism will have the opportunity of using her experience, her statesmanship, in the organization of the future of any European super-state confederation. It is true that before this war some British statesmen did not consider democracy to be an article for export; in some cases they were not displeased when certain other nations were none too democratic. It is true that democracy itself is no guarantee of a peace-loving outlook, but it definitely puts a brake upon imperialistic tendencies. A democratic Germany, a democratic

Italy, and a democratic Hungary would probably not have involved Europe—and the world—in a war as easily as have the autocratic régimes in those lands. It is also true that the democratic forms in one country cannot be transferred to other countries without changes. It is sufficient to keep the common basis of democracy, although the form may be varied. We hope that British policy and British diplomacy will be a powerful encouragement and support after the war to the democratic tendencies in those countries not yet trained to democracy. Seven hundred years of democratic development in Britain have created an understanding for those elementary “decencies,” which have become so much part of Britons that they cannot imagine life without them. This perhaps explains why Great Britain watched so patiently the actions of Naziism and Fascism in the countries of their origin and later in the occupied territories. It has, however, become evident that the standard and security of British life depend on maintaining those “decencies” in the rest of the world. Those who bombarded undefended British towns and killed British women and children formerly persecuted Jews and Socialists in Germany, and tried out their methods in other countries before they dared to turn them on this country. International “decency” is one of the guarantees of British security, and in her own interests Great Britain must see to it that men everywhere are treated with humanity.

THE TEACHING OF AMERICAN HISTORY

BY D. W. BROGAN

IT was, I think, Sir William Harcourt, who said around 1900: "We are all Socialists now." Something of the same mass conversion seems to have struck politicians and academics; the gainer being not socialism but American history. It is not very long since eminent persons could blithely refer to Alexander Hamilton as the author of the Constitution or even of the Declaration of Independence or could confuse the two documents with no qualms of conscience. Then all that was needed for a powerful speech on American problems was an acquaintance with the late F. S. Oliver's *Alexander Hamilton*. American history was the hobby of a few people but it was academically unprofitable. Few universities or schools even professed to do anything about it and of those that did, fewer still had anything like adequate resources for teaching or studying it. There were only two chairs of American history, in Oxford and in London and nothing that could be described as a school.

This indifference to American history, reflected in the stern refusal of the British public to buy books on the subject as much as in the disinclination of the really able undergraduate to take the subject seriously, has long been a subject of lamentation among the few zealots. Bodies like the Carnegie and Commonwealth foundations or the Rhodes Trustees have done a good deal to make library facilities better. The regular stream of graduate students sent to the United States by the great foundations has done more. It is not only that facilities have thus been given to intending historians to study American history in America, but an interest in the subject has been fostered in other academics, in chemists and lawyers. But it was safe to say that, other things being equal, knowledge of American history was a marginal unit in the intellectual equipment of the *intelligentzia*.

Nor was this all. While institutional efforts to increase in American history were more zealous in the last ten years, the facilities for developing that interest got worse. Before

the great slump, American publishers could afford prestige budgets. All or nearly all important American books were published here or, at any rate, were sent for review here. That is no longer so. Only the university presses keep up the good old custom of sending over a few copies of each important book. But private publishers, especially those with no direct London connections, no longer bother. It is hard to blame either the American publishers or their British colleagues. Even before October, 1929, the rewards of enterprise in this field were meagre. One of the best books on American history, already a kind of classic in the United States, was published at considerable expense here. Less than two hundred copies were sold while in America it sold many thousands. At least once a year I receive from publishers American typescripts or proofs or books with a request for my opinion of their value for the English market and in almost every case I am forced to state that even the best of them will find few readers—in a country where the Viennese industry of gingered-up history has found no difficulty in taking root.

To give examples of the difficulties of the study of American history here is only too easy. As far as I know, no volume of the admirable series of the American Political Leaders edited by Professor Allan Nevins has been published here or even reviewed. Yet that series includes such fundamental books for the study of Anglo-American relations as Professor Nevins' life of Hamilton Fish and so essential a book for the understanding of the reactions of conservative Republicans to the League of Nations as Professor Jessup's life of Elihu Root. Again, Mr. Pringle's life of Taft has not been reviewed here, although it is of the greatest interest for the inner story of American attitudes to the Peace of Versailles and the League of Nations.

It is natural, then, the first-class books of more technical interest like Dr. Buck's *Road to Reunion* should be unknown here. The case is worse if we reflect that there are only two good specialized American history libraries in this country, at Oxford and London. In other universities, the would-be teacher of American history has to order books unseen or come to London or Oxford or rely on seriously inadequate local resources.

It is against this background that the current campaign for the study of American history should be seen. That campaign is being directed with great energy, skill and good-will. On the efforts made to increase the amount of time spent in the

teaching of American history in schools, on the training of teachers to do the job, on the production of text-books, on what may be called the tactics of the campaign, I do not wish to write here. The efforts are zealous and the first fruits promising. I shall attempt the more ungrateful task of pointing out some dangers, dangers mainly of emphasis. It will be more than a pity if this campaign fails, in whole or in part, because of an undue simplification of the problem. That simplification will not be the fault of the teachers or of the educational officials. It will be the fault of the public and of the politicians for whom "American history" is something a good deal simpler and more manageable than it is for the student or teacher. American history will have no educational, or social, or political value in our educational system if it is in any way treated as a "stunt," instead of being studied as a subject of great intrinsic interest. And there is some danger of American history being treated as a special aspect of British history, as having as its main theme war and diplomacy. Yet there must be a firm resistance to the temptation to explain American history in terms of British analogies. Some themes can be so explained. There should be no minimizing of the common legal, cultural, religious links, but a great deal of American history can only be understood in American terms and it must be studied with the same readiness to make the necessary effort as is expected of the students of any other country. And if British teaching of American history differs notably from good American teaching of American history, it is a pretty safe assumption that it is differing for the worse.

One problem that faces the "Americanist" in this campaign for the introduction of American history into British schools is the survival of the wide-spread illusion that American schools and colleges still teach American history in the spirit of Mr. Jefferson Brick, that twisting the lion's tail, that reviving all the bitterness of the Revolution or the War of 1812 is practically a prescribed part of the standard American curriculum. This is an illusion that dies hard. There are backward schools and colleges; there are backward states; there are stupid or even malignant teachers. But I should say that the educational systems of the great majority of the states of the Union are in this respect a model, not a horrible example. That American history is taught with somewhat less than the objectivity that one would expect from a visitor from Mars is true, but it is taught with a good deal more objectivity than it was a generation ago and certainly with a good deal more

objectivity than British history was taught in Scottish schools when I was at school.

The belief that there is a fixed, anti-British *school* tradition in America is an obstacle to the teaching of American history in British schools because it fosters the belief that there is a common, "good thing" version of American history in which nearly all was for the best. It also confuses the issue in another way, for it implies that the main theme of American history is Anglo-American history—which is dangerously untrue. Thus a schoolmaster writing to the *Daily Telegraph* on August 20, 1941, complains that "while the story of the struggle for American independence has been taught for years in our own schools in an impartial manner, the teaching being accompanied by notes giving 'arguments for' as well as 'arguments against,' the American boy is still taught about this unfortunate episode in our history in a manner which too frequently gives him a prejudice against us."

The assertion about American education in general is, like all such assertions, far too sweeping to be safe. There is not one unified educational system; there are forty-eight. Indeed, even that is a misstatement for inside a state there may be important variations. But some indication of the bias of history teaching in America can be got from the inspection of American text-books. Rightly or wrongly, American teaching depends more completely on the text-book than does ours. These text-books are more expensive, more lavishly produced, usually written by more formally eminent persons than ours. One result is that publishers and authors are conscious of the pressure of professional opinion and hesitate (they have no doubt higher motives as well) to make fools of themselves by naive displays of chauvinism. Take for example a recent and admirable specimen designed for high schools.* The statement by these experienced teachers of the Anglo-American controversy is certainly far from justifying the strictures of the letter-writer. "Even the most hurried examination of the factors in the controversy ending in the Revolution leads one quickly to discard the old theory that the Revolution occurred because an English despot was seeking to recover his lost power." What objection can be made to that? Other text-books of the same rank (as far as the eminence of their authors and publishers go) take the same line.

* *America, Its History and People*, by Harold Underwood Faulkner and Tyler Kepner, Harpers. Professor Faulkner teaches at one of the best American women's colleges, Smith, and Mr. Kepner is Director of Social Studies in the public schools (council schools) of Brookline, Mass.

But the real danger in this view of how American history is taught in American schools lies in the attitude revealed in the last part of the letter. "The American boy is still taught about this unfortunate episode in our history in a manner which too frequently gives him a prejudice against us." "This unfortunate episode in our history!" But for the American boy it is neither an episode nor unfortunate. It is basic to the whole of modern American political history and institutions. It is not a mere case of deciding whether it is or is not unfortunate that George III. ever occurred. The problem for the teacher of American history in both countries is the same; it is not returning a moral verdict on the conduct of George III., Lord North, George Washington or even Benedict Arnold. It is explaining, not necessarily justifying, a great event which the Americans insist on calling not "the struggle for American independence" but "the American Revolution." And until our teachers begin to think as well as talk of it as "the American Revolution," the prolonged political, military and economic crisis which resulted in the establishment of the United States under its present constitution will remain unintelligible.

What is to be avoided is the illusion that teaching even enlightened views about those parts of American history which obviously impinge on British history is teaching American history. An analogy will show how absurd this view is. French history impinges more often and more dramatically on British history than does American history. But no history teacher (I hope) falls into the trap that study of the two great French Wars between 1793 and 1815 is the same thing as studying the history of the French Revolution and the Empire. That must be studied for its own intrinsic interest. Because there were no British troops involved, the Battle of Jena is not to be neglected in favour of the Battle of Maida—even in Maida Vale. The Code, the Concordat, the *Conseil d'Etat* are all worth study even though they have no obvious implications for the understanding of the younger Pitt or Lord Eldon or Wilberforce.

So with American history. The Americans call the crisis of which one dramatic and obvious consequence was the separation from Britain "the American Revolution." They do this because it *was* a revolution; the War of Independence was only a part of the whole. What light does moralizing about George III. cast on the contract clause of the Constitution? What light does admiration for the public spirit of the (English) Whigs cast on the land problem on the frontier? None or next

to none. Even if the case of George III. in English history could seem as simple now as it did in pre-Namier days, the case of George Washington or George Mason is what should be studied in studying American history.

The error of judgment that reduces the complex and fascinating problem of the birth of the United States to a mere family quarrel that could have been easily ended by tact and understanding is the most conspicuous example of the delusion that by American history we should mean the study of Anglo-American relations. But it can be seen in other less dramatic ways. The origins, the conduct, the results of the War of 1812 can be made to yield both interest and enlightenment in the hands of a scholar of the calibre of Professor A. L. Burt.* But it can be freely admitted that a British school-time table has very little room for the details of this episode. But what it must have room for is for understanding why it is not a mere episode for Americans. If time is so short that only ten minutes or so can be devoted to the two and a half wasteful years of war between 1812 and 1815, let it be devoted to explaining why the Democratic party in the United States holds its annual bean-feast on January 8; to why, in normal times, the leader or leaders of the party meet in Washington to hear a pronouncement on party aims and on party fortunes. For nine years past the leader of the Democratic party has been Mr. Roosevelt and he is peculiarly fitted to speak on Jackson Day as he is a most fervid admirer of Andrew Jackson. And why Andrew Jackson and why January 8? Because on that day in 1815, General Jackson easily defeated a British army under the Duke of Wellington's brother-in-law, an army that was attempting to take New Orleans. To explain why Jackson became a political after being a military hero; to explain the fact that the recently French and Spanish city of New Orleans was involved; to explain the modern relevance of these facts; this would be to teach American history, not to teach "Anglo-American relations." And there are several good reasons why we should teach the first and not the second. It is a far richer, far more nourishing subject than "Anglo-American" relations. And the second, narrower, and more arid subject cannot be taught in anything but the most futile examination sense without a background of American history studied and assimilated for its own sake. We have, in fact, no choice. If American history teaching is not going to be just another burden on over-

**The United States, Great Britain and British North America, from the Revolution to the Establishment of the Peace after the War of 1812.* (Oxford University Press).

loaded teachers and pupils, it will have to be studied for itself.

This is not, it is important to insist, that it should be taught and studied in isolation from general history, but merely that it should not be taught as a part of English history, that the United States should not be thought of as a lost dominion or as a laggard ally.

Another danger inherent in the situation was indicated by a friend of mine. He asserted that it would be one of the duties of the teachers and text-book writers to replace the picture of American life given by Hollywood by a truer and less dangerous one. This is to ask far too much of the teacher and the text-book. It is natural that teachers of all ranks should look with some suspicion and fear on the picture of any society given by the cinema. The simple themes of violence, luxury, movement, sex that make the movies so fascinating to the average adolescent are handled sometimes coarsely, sometimes stupidly, always too simply. But to imagine that they can be countered by simple appeals to the "better elements" of adolescent nature against the skilful exploitation of these passionate interests by the highly-paid and highly skilled employees of the great film combines, is to suffer from professional delusions of grandeur. An open war against the picture of America given by the movies is a war bound to end badly—or rather to end in a complete victory for Hollywood.

It is far better to face the facts. For better or worse, the average boy is going to get his most vivid picture of American life from the movies as, a generation before, he got it from the "bloods" in which Buffalo Bill and his brethren forever rode to do justice and endless Redskins bit the dust. In the United States, there is a constant stream of complaints from parents and teachers about the deplorable effects of the movies. I have talked with American grade and high school teachers on this theme and their remedy has usually been the encouragement of "worthwhile" movies. But, alas, there are so few "worthwhile" movies, that is movies whose values, sense of proportion, fidelity in detail, caution in the treatment of sex meet the standards of teachers and parents. Those which do have these qualities, too often have also a fault which makes their virtues barren; they are dull. I have been told with distress more than once how, in Zenith City, a worthwhile movie which some women's club or Parent-Teachers' Association had brought had played to empty seats, while some deplorably low-brow opus had filled all the local movie houses. Quite often the public was showing truer taste than its mentors; the "good"

movie was an incompetent job; the "bad" one at least did what it set out to do.

Hollywood does distort contemporary American life and mutilate American history. But save in such special genres as "musicals," the average Hollywood film does attempt to be pictorially plausible. And as its main audience is American, Hollywood has to give an exterior picture of American life that an American audience will not find ludicrously unlike the real thing. Clothes, houses, cars, furniture, speech have to be at worst prettifications of the real thing. Hollywood still gives a more lifelike picture of America than the British film industry, even before the war, gave of Britain. The boy and girl who is being taught American history in a British school has his mind filled with visual images of American life that are not impossibly remote from reality. The average American may never have seen a gangster, but there are gangsters; he may never have seen a drought but there are droughts. And it is absurd in such circumstances to pretend that he does not learn something of America (and of American history) even from movies set in contemporary America. It would be wrong, on these grounds, to regret that the pupil may have a more vivid memory of *High Sierra*, or of *Mr. Smith Goes to Washington*, or of *The Grapes of Wrath* than of some more formally historical book or picture that he has been forced to study at school. And there is little or no need to excite interest in contemporary America. The movies do that; so do *Life* and *Time*.

But "this is not history;" that is, it is not past history. History is easier (both to teach and to write) when it is dead or when the actors are dead and the movements are classified and the end known. But even for that kind of history, for the study of great events, of great struggles whose end is known, it would be a mistake to ignore the help that can be given by the movies and the futility of ignoring the fact that, if the movies are treated as an enemy, they will be a certainly victorious enemy. The historical movie has often been bad enough in all conscience. Not only has it been comically inaccurate in detail but it has been profoundly unhistorical in theme and spirit. Hollywood has not totally reformed but at any rate its treatment of American history has greatly improved. It is true that Hollywood tends to take over existing best-sellers and best-sellers do not always show much historical sense in plan or writing. But the recent *engouement* of the American reading public with American history has created a market for serious historical novels and Hollywood has benefited thereby.

It is true that *Gone With the Wind* still preaches the doctrine of Southern gentility and Yankee rapacity—but *Gone With the Wind* is a model of historical proportion compared with earlier Civil War novels and films and, as a counter to its saccharinity, even Hollywood has not been able to remove all the claws from the script of *Kiss the Boys Goodbye*.

Even the most critical and modernistic minded teacher of American history will not be content with commenting on films and on popular novels. He will need some dominant theme to hold the attention of the intelligent pupil who is not content with a chronological string of unconnected and rather boring facts. It has to be admitted that American political history bores most people; even most Americans bring but a tepid interest to it. Yet some political history is indispensable. We must not confine our teaching programmes to the Revolution, the Civil War and the World War. Nor will it be wise to treat the history of the United States merely as a successful exercise in federalism. All of these things have their relevance but they are only parts of a bigger pattern. That pattern is the territorial and economic growth of the United States.

Basically, American history north and south, like Australian and North and South African history, is the record of the expansion of Europe, of its peoples, languages, civilization into more or less open country. In some regions, North and South Africa, Peru and Mexico, the country was not quite so open. But all colonial expansion has certain characteristics in common and the common themes can be illustrated. The overflow of Europe from the sixteenth century on is the dominating theme of world history. The most striking and important example of that overflow is the United States.

American history, political and constitutional, occurred in space as well as time. Without overdoing the frontier theory, the territorial growth of the United States is American history.

"Westward the course of Empire takes its way." Seen from this light, the constitution, the parties, the Civil War, isolationism, the Revolution, all fall into place. Boys who are bored with mere narrative can be stimulated with map-making and there is a lot to be said for asking the geography specialist, when there is one, to take over the teaching of American history. Faced with American history in its more formal character, the pupil may react with no great enthusiasm for taking up his new burden of information. But generations of teachers have discovered (with modified rapture) that there is one theme that holds most boys from play and learning alike. Indians

and cowboys are as popular as ever. Even adults of a high degree of sophistication found some of the old magic in *Stagecoach*. The Apache and the Sioux, there is the jam for the pill! The boys may be highly partisan; they may prefer the Indians to the Paleface, *victrix causa*, very rightly, is a theme that does not appeal to youth. But the fact that boys regret the defeat of the Trojans does not make the Iliad bad material for pedagogic art. Tell the boys how the Indians gave way to the frontiersmen and how they, in turn, gave way to the sedentary farmers who, in turn, gave way to the city population. For by that time the wheel will have turned full circle and in the fight between G men and gangsters, the old theme recurs—with a more even chance for law and order to win sympathy than mere progress had in the story of the Indian wars. On the foundations of geography and Indian lore, how much can be built! George Washington will be no longer merely the intolerably veracious child or the intolerably virtuous man. He can be the youthful adventurer on the frontier who, at an age when in peace-time English boys are thinking of scholarship examinations or school cricket, was commanding on the frontier and firing the first shots in a great war, a very young man more like the heroes of the R.A.F. than like an animated bust.

American history is about roads and boats and railways, great rivers, great deserts, great lakes, explorers, adventurers, bandits. It is more than that, true, but let the boy get the sense of movement, of the march of the English into and through the vast eastern forests to the prairies and the plains, the march north of the Spaniards through the deserts and the mountains, the march south of the Russians over the ice wastes of Alaska; these are the themes that stir the admiration of the young. Once his interest is aroused, the political and constitutional themes can be made relevant and even exciting. And the puzzling and the irritating aspects of some American attitudes to Europe and the world will seem more comprehensible, if not less belated survivals of a once defensible historical tradition. The more thoroughly the boy grasps the truth that American history is profoundly American, that geology and climate play their part as well as *Magna Carta* and the Pilgrim Fathers, the better prepared will he be for an understanding of the American rôle in the modern world. *Tout comprendre* may not be infallibly followed by *tout pardonner*, but it often will be. And in any case, understanding of so great a historical phenomenon as the United States is a good thing in itself.

FARMLAND'S FUTURE

BY S. L. BENSUSAN

QUESTIONS of land tenure are so highly controversial that they cannot be discussed within reasonable limits, but it is impossible for the most impartial observer to ignore the trend of expert opinion towards nationalization. In the past few years more and more men, whose interest in the future of the soil of Britain is not affected by party politics, have declared themselves in favour of the change for which Lord Addison in his great book *A Policy for British Agriculture* has advanced so powerful a plea. Opponents of drastic change are limited and are led by men who can still control agricultural estates effectively, generally by the aid of their private means or big business interests.

One of the main causes of the attitude of experts is awareness at long last of the shocking state into which our fields had fallen when war smote us in 1939. This condition was the aftermath of the 1914-1918 period, when land values rose and Landlords sold out while the Government passed a Corn Production Act in one year and repealed it in the next. Farmers could not carry their newly-acquired freeholds, a terrible slump in values ensued, and clean land went out of fashion.

Under the old dispensation, great landlords, to whom less than justice has been done, administered their estates strictly. Tenancy agreements insisted on certain crop rotations and kept straw and hay for use on the farm. Buildings were maintained, remission of a part of the rent would be given in bad years. The landlord had his amenities, his shooting and hunting and fishing; these were his chief reward and sufficed him even when rents fell and rates, tithes with perhaps mortgage interest, pressed heavily. In fact, the land was strongly held, there was no rush to sell until prices soared. "I've passed from two per cent. on farms to four-and-a-half in first-class securities," a great landowner told me when the term "great" had certainly ceased to apply as a measure of ownership. While the crisis in farming spread ruin, the Government of the day, no matter whether it was that of Mr. MacDonald, Mr.

Baldwin or Mr. Chamberlain, did nothing worth doing; indeed, the last-named hinted on one occasion that farming could not look for most-favoured nation treatment. Assurances to the farming community were based on vote values and, as a Minister once remarked to the writer: "Agriculture is always at the bottom of the Cabinet Agenda."

Now that millions have been spent and still more must be spent on breaking up grassland, ditching, hedging, draining and feeding starved soil, the cost has fallen upon the State and the impossibility of allowing the farmlands to revert again to prairie has impressed itself upon the dullest imagination. But can we be sure that we have learned through adversity to recognize that we have no finer and more enduring asset than our farms? Do we accept the duty imposed upon us of seeing that the best possible use is made of them and that they are not left to the mercy or the whim of the industrialists?

I have been reading of Curlew Moss in Lancashire where 75 acres now reclaimed had been lost to use under six feet of bracken, willow-herb, bushes and brambles. Lately I have seen still larger areas in Essex, once London's granary, that had been bought by land speculators for the sake of road frontages. Only these frontages concerned them, they allowed the rest of the land to go to ruin; wartime clearance cost about eight pounds an acre and was only possible by the aid of heavy machinery. From Lancashire to Essex is a far cry, but a like story can doubtless be told all through the intervening countryside. There is no law to keep any man from buying as many acres of England as he can pay for and, having bought, he can allow them to fall into complete ruin. Under the stress of war an Agricultural Committee can take over and cultivate land after having it valued, but the tenure will extend only to the end of war and three years later. Then the owner can recover if he will pay for the improvements, and the farm will be his to do what he likes with again. In Essex much of the waste land of speculators is ownerless. Many of those who bought it and could not sell frontages, together with those who sold out, have disappeared; it has proved impossible to trace them; the land has been proclaimed, taken over and is now the property of the county authority. Most people will agree that the Britain of the future must be strongly held but in the absence of capable landlords who understand and dictate proper acts of husbandry, only the State remains.

The Great War caught us napping, but in 1939 the position of English agricultural land was much worse than it had been

twenty-five years earlier when so many of the old landlords were carrying on. The one factor that has saved the situation through the crisis has been the development of agricultural machinery. Even those of us who hope that the countryside of the future will hold small cultivators in great and ever increasing numbers must admit the debt we owe to-day to the seventy thousand first-class tractors that have grown out of fifteen hundred doubtful ones of the earlier war period. They have accomplished a vast task in record time and made the road clearer for associations like the Homecroft and Catholic Land which seek to give the small man his chance and re-establish rural England. Yet while we recognize and are grateful for the help given to farming, and the splendid service of the County Committees, we must bear in mind that where agriculture is involved the effort must be sustained. If Committees lose their powers after the war, if agriculture remains at the bottom of the Cabinet agenda, if the claws of the land speculator are not pared, the old bad conditions inevitably will return. Nature endures clean land and sound cultivations, but does not welcome them. She loves a prairie and will create one where and when she can.

Talking to the Farmers' Club in December last, the Minister of Agriculture said the people of this country should learn to regard the pursuit of a healthy and well-balanced agriculture as an essential part of our post-war policy. Most sane folk will agree with him, but many will remember that similar statements were made in 1919. Some may ask why, since Viscount Lee of Fareham left Whitehall Place, successive Cabinets have persistently obstructed his successors in the pursuit of stable conditions.

Let us suppose for the purpose of further argument that the value of our soil is to be recognized, that the land of Great Britain is to have a fair chance and that we shall seek to develop it in peace as in war. What is the most important prerequisite? Is it not that those who handle the land should know something about proper acts of husbandry? Land is not and cannot be the property of any individual. The proudest landlord is no more than a tenant for life, with or without power of appointment; the landlord dies, the land remains. A few inches of the earth's surface constitute mankind's greatest asset and the bounden though neglected duty of every generation is to pass it on to the next unexhausted, and as well cultivated as may be. Among many primitive tribes, as students of Lord Hailey's masterly *African Survey* will remember, this principle is

observed; in the most highly civilized communities it is ignored. The exploitation of the soil in the United States and Canada, to name but two countries, has robbed millions of acres of their fertility for no better reason than that under existing laws the rights of the land can be violated and those of the next generation may be ignored.

It is common knowledge that for nearly a century past the new world has been selling fertility to the old in return for manufactured products. Now that the new has ceased in large measure to be dependent upon the old, farmers find much of their natural wealth lost, while, in Great Britain at least, the ability to buy food cheaply in foreign markets has produced the derelict acres, so sore a present concern to our rulers. The proportion that was badly farmed or even ranched down to 1939 was terribly high. This is not the mere opinion of the writer, who may claim to have visited every county in England, Scotland and Wales several times in the last fifteen years; it is the general verdict of the War Agricultural Committees, and until the underlying problem is solved, there can be no lasting improvement.

Consider the laws that regulate the professions. Should a man desire to be a doctor, a lawyer, an architect, or an engineer, he must undergo a course of training and satisfy shrewd examiners before he is free to practise. His failure or success will matter to few save himself. But if he has money and an ambition to handle the world's greatest asset, that upon which all life—human, animal and vegetable—depends, he is free to buy the best on the market and, having bought, to beggar it. Agriculture has been and may yet be again our greatest national industry, the soil must remain our best asset. Is it not time, if agriculture is to be all that our rulers promise, to treat farming as a profession, to demand a standard of proficiency and so to regulate agricultural practice? Of late years we have refused to take new veterinary surgeons without examinations; they must show qualifications. Should we not say that no man shall enter upon land without satisfying a competent authority that he understands the principles of farming and is in a position to carry on the work properly, that is to say by keeping sufficient staff, stock and implements to render justice to his holding? If he is a good man and cannot work unaided, he should have access to the necessary means. This involves recognition of the basic truth that the land belongs to the nation and that no generation can ever be more than the trustees for its successors, that the country is the proper breed-

ing ground for all three kingdoms, human, animal and vegetable, and that he who wastes or spoils cultivable land should be deprived of its control. Though this proposal is bound to offend, it is in truth only giving permanency to principles the war has established and it is free from all taint of politics.

The application of the principles set out here need give no trouble. Sitting tenants are already farming under surveillance, the County Agricultural Committee can lend them machinery, give them advice, or even take over their land. The only bad side of this present method is that the country is putting money into the pockets of certain indifferent farmers by doing their work and leaving them to reap the profits, and that in the long run all these Government aids are in existing circumstances a grant to landlords. Even then there is a benefit to the community as well as the individual while no man suffers disturbance unless the County Authority decides that he is quite unable to farm properly. Whether individual or state ownership prevails, some tribunal should exercise its function when a farm becomes vacant. Presuming it to be a sub-committee of the chief county organization, members should inspect land and buildings to decide how the place must be farmed in the interests of the community, and what capital or credit an applicant should possess. Then the man who proposes to farm would be put through his paces and called upon to show qualifications for handling a part of the nation's most enduring wealth. Extensive as opposed to intensive farming would be ruled out, so would neglected hedges and choked ditches. A balance would be required between arable and grass, and a proper proportion of live-stock demanded by a mixed farm, with a view to restoring or maintaining the humus that 'artificials' tend to destroy—all official statements to the contrary notwithstanding.

There might well be a return to some of the farming covenants in general use before the great land sales that followed the 1914-1918 war. Under these, rotations were laid down and the sale of hay or straw was strictly forbidden. England was better cultivated when such limitations were imposed and accepted. There was far less farming for Friday night; land did not go out of production, nor did arable tumble down to grass. The major part of our latter-day trouble is due to the fact that farmers paid too much for their holdings twenty years or so ago and, having borrowed from the banks and lost the protection of the Corn Production Act, were in

many cases forced to farm in a fashion that would have shocked their fathers.

This war is providing a chance, perhaps a last chance, of returning to wiser methods while asserting the principle that all land under whatever tenure must be handled in the interest of the nation as a whole.

As the science of destruction proceeds apace, and certainly no other science has kept pace with it, new and more dangerous methods of injuring the land interests are bound to come. The dive bomber and the magnetic mine will have their successors and the danger to sea-borne supplies is hardly likely to lessen. It follows that we must rely more and more upon our resources, and we can only do this if those entrusted with farms are qualified to turn them to good account and if the small cultivator is brought back and made welcome in the countryside that is his proper heritage.

THE NEED FOR GREATER EFFORT

By J. B. S. HALDANE

THE war is being fought on a number of fronts, on land, on sea, in the air, and in the minds of men and women. All these fronts are essential. The sea war is a special case. A series of Nazi naval successes would starve Britain out, and long before this happened would cripple her war effort. But if every ship in the German navy were destroyed, this would not of itself win the war. It would not even win the battle of the Atlantic completely, since many of our ships are sunk or damaged by long-range bombers. We may lose the war at sea. We can only win it on the other fronts.

The vast majority of the British people dislike the war and want it to end as soon as possible. But this does not mean that they want either surrender or a compromise which leaves Hitler and Mussolini in power, and therefore makes a resumption of the war inevitable.

Their attitude is that of a Czech called Kalmus whom I was recently suffocating during some experiments intended to facilitate escape from submarines. Just before losing consciousness he wrote: "I have had quite enough, I have had quite enough—not necessarily too much." He was determined to carry on, in order to save sailors of the people which had given him refuge from Hitler, but he did not pretend he liked it. This is pretty much the attitude of most people in severely bombed towns.

Who wants to keep the war going as long as possible? A few capitalists in the United States armament industry who are making a good thing out of it. Not Roosevelt, who knows that a war boom is inevitably followed by a disastrous slump. A very much smaller number of profiteers in this country. A few mugs in the British army who are afraid they won't get enough fighting. The Japanese Government and militarists, who realize that if Britain, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. had no other commitments, they probably could and would help China more effectually. Lastly, and this is extremely important, certain sections in this country, especially among the ruling classes. Here is their argument:

We hate National Socialism and Communism. Both are threats to the British Empire, to our economic and religious systems. If they can destroy one another, we shall get another lease of life. A rapid victory for the Soviets, which did not leave them crippled and exhausted, would be as bad as a victory for Hitler.

It is ridiculous to pretend that such people do not exist, and that they do not occupy some of the key positions in this country. Mr. Churchill's speech of June 22, 1941, in which he promised aid to the Soviets, was largely directed against this group.

There are also a few people who would like to stop the war now, on terms very favourable to Hitler. They belong to many groups. There are the pacifists who think war wrong, the people who are so demoralized by air raids that they are ready to surrender, and the fascists who think that if Hitler won they would get nice jobs like that of Major Quisling. There is a tiny group of extreme left anarchists and Trotskyists who would rejoice to see the present British and Soviet governments fall, no matter what happened afterwards. These are the people who listen to the Workers' Challenge station on the radio, commonly known as the W.C. on account of the dirty language it uses. This station puts over some quite plausible arguments, which the *Daily Worker* used to answer, but which now go unanswered.

Finally, there are those who still wish to switch the war, the men and women to whom Hess brought a message. They were quite vocal during the first year of the war. If it goes well they will once more become influential. If Soviet troops near Berlin they will do their utmost to send the British army to "save civilization" with the aid of Pétain, Franco, and presumably some German and Italian generals, if not the present Nazi and Fascist leaders.

An attempt to switch the war in this way is however as likely to cause a revolution in Britain as to end the present war and start another one. The British people will not forget either who bombed them, or who were the first to hold up Hitler's armies.

Mr. Churchill is, I believe, a realist. He will not like seeing socialism established in Central Europe. He did not, I presume, like handing over British territory to the U.S.A. as naval bases. But he may nevertheless realize that both are part of the price which must be paid for victory.

From the point of view of the British manufacturer a socialist Germany would be an advantage, since its industries would

compete with those of Britain less than did those of capitalist Germany. For a socialist country does not export goods except in return for imports which it needs.

The different aspects of the war on land, on sea, and in the air—are very intimately bound up, and any division must be artificial. Thus the sea war can be won, among other methods, by cutting down non-essential imports.

The less food we waste the less we must import. A very large amount of barley and hops grown in this country is used for making beer, which has practically no food value. The barley could be used for bread or feeding cattle. The hop-fields could be used for beans or other food plants. If not another gallon of beer were brewed, this would save scores of ships for essential imports. But the disappearance of beer would cause grave resentment, both among beer drinkers and in the drink trade, some sections of which are making record profits at present. The resentment would be legitimate if the soldiers got no beer while the officers had their whisky. So the country as a whole would have to go "dry." On the other hand I see no reason why the publicans should be better treated than the little shopkeepers who are forbidden to sell rationed food because they have less than 25 customers registered. But this gigantic food waste could only be stopped after a big propaganda campaign. And in view of the close connection between the Conservative Party and the drink trade, I do not believe that it will be stopped. I may add in parenthesis that I am not a total abstainer, but have very nearly become so for the duration of the war.

We can roughly divide our field into production, strategy, and politics, provided we realize that they are intimately bound up. The question whether a factory should make shells, mines, or bombs depends on the relative importance of land, sea, and air war. The question whether men should be conscripted from an industry into the army depends on the demands which the forces are likely to make on that industry.

We have a very large army. It was originally intended to fight on the Continent. It now has three possible functions. The first is to resist invasion of Britain. The second is to fight on the Middle Eastern fronts. The third is to invade Europe. Now the army is much too big for the first two tasks. No one supposes that Hitler could land even half a million men in Britain unless he had gained command of the sea and air, in which case we should be beaten without an invasion. We could beat any smaller force with the Home Guard and a smaller

army than we have at present. And the shortage of shipping makes it very difficult to supply a much larger army than that which is at present stationed in the East. Hence unless the army is to be used in Europe it is too large, and we should do better to employ a large section of it on production.

If on the other hand a new British Expeditionary Force can be used to divert a large fraction of Hitler's army at the critical moment when he needs every man on the Eastern front, then our army will have justified its existence by playing a decisive part in the war. I have no idea what operations of this kind are practicable. But one can imagine a British landing on the flat coast near Dunkirk, and when this had drawn away the main German forces in Northern France, another in Brittany designed among other things to capture Brest from the landward side and either destroy the German ships there or drive them out to meet our fleet. It might be impossible to hold the ground gained. The difficulties of evacuation might be as great as in Greece and Crete, and the casualties as heavy. But such raids might draw off troops from the East at a decisive moment, as in 1914 the Russian invasion of East Prussia, though severely defeated at Tannenberg, diverted German troops from France, and probably turned the scale of the battle of the Marne. If our army can play such a part its existence is fully justified. Otherwise it may be reserved for a not too glorious and almost useless part similar to that of the Italian army in the defeat of France. And the suspicion that highly placed people are "pulling our punches" will grow.

Our air force is doing magnificent work in hampering Nazi war industry, interrupting transport, and drawing off Nazi planes from the Eastern Front. It is possible that they might go further. If, as may be the case, the Soviet Air Force needs help, it would be possible to send British fighters over Turkey to the Caucasus, or if Turkish neutrality is taken seriously, over the Hindu Kush range from India to Uzbekistan, and thence in comparatively few hops, to the front. The necessary ground staff and at least some materials for repairs could be sent by larger planes such as Wellingtons. This is in addition to any help which could be sent by Murmansk, Archangel, and other Arctic ports.

I shall be accused of suggesting a reckless sacrifice of British soldiers and airmen to save the Soviet Union. The answer is simple. If the army is ever intended to land and fight in Europe, it will have a vastly harder task should the Red Army be beaten or even immobilized, than when the bulk of the

German army is in the East. Every British life lost now may save ten in the future. In the same way the pilots of British fighters on the Eastern front would generally bale out on friendly soil if they were brought down while tackling German dive-bombers, whereas if brought down over France, Belgium, or Holland, they must face captivity.

As regards production, Sir John Wardlaw-Milne, the chairman of the Select Committee on National Expenditure, a Conservative M.P., has stated that the actual figure is 75 per cent. of the possible. Mr. Churchill has made no attempt to refute this statement, merely pointing out that production is larger than in 1940 or 1918.

There are many reasons for this low production.

One is interference with transport by bombers and U-boats. I doubt if this amounts to 5 per cent. out of the 25 per cent. deficit at present.

Another is shortage of labour. This is particularly serious in the mining industry, from which tens of thousands of men have been taken to polish buttons in the army. These key men should be released at once. They could be called up again if heavy casualties occurred. Another is slackness, largely due to disgust at the inefficiency with which industry is run. It is only found in a minority of workers, but it exists. It can only be overcome by propaganda, and much of the existing propaganda is very bad. For example the South Wales Miners' leaders were recently addressed by a distinguished and gallant officer on behalf of the Government. In urging them to increase production he used very "purple" language, forgetting that many of his audience were pious Methodists. Arthur Horner, the Chairman of the South Wales Miners' Federation, asked to be permitted to broadcast an appeal to the colliers for bigger output. His offer was declined! The Government must realize that workers will listen to their elected representatives with an attention which they will not accord to "the best people."

The main causes are inefficient management and bad working conditions. The 10 per cent. cost plus system puts a premium on inefficiency. If a firm uses 80,000 man-hours to make an aeroplane it is paid twice as much as if it used 40,000 man-hours. Firms which honestly try to produce the utmost realize that their less honest competitors will make larger profits. The way out is simple. Under the law of May, 1940, the Government has the power to take over any firm, as it can and does conscript labour. It should take over some of the

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worst offenders in several different industries. This step would be welcomed, not only by manual workers, but by the managers and other supervisory staff.

The Soviet Union has shown that socialism is a success in war production. I do not say that our war industry should be immediately socialized, as this would inevitably cause a slowing down during the transition period, and the present situation is too critical to permit this. I do urge that existing powers should be used where necessary. In the last war the National Filling Factories not merely succeeded, but set a standard for other factories. Our present production policy is the continuation of the pre-war policy, which left us, in the words of Mr. Justice Atkinson, unable to fight a cockroach. In many factories the shop stewards, who are elected by the workers, could do much to fight inefficiency.

Equally serious are the working conditions. You cannot expect men and women to work efficiently if their factories and offices are underventilated and ill-lit, if they have to travel and queue up for buses for three hours daily before and after 10 hours of work.

Here are four quotations from the First Emergency Report of the Medical Research Council, published in January, 1940:—

- (1) Avoid over-long hours and continuous work without intervals of rest.
- (2) Allow Sunday rest and ordinary holidays.
- (3) Misguided efforts to stimulate workers to feverish activity in the supposed interests of output are as useless as would be the cheers of partisans encouraging a long-distance runner to a futile sprint early in the race.
- (4) Full opportunities for the expression of grievances or complaints will prevent difficulties and misunderstandings, and in that way conduce to low sickness, absence, and wastage rates.

Detailed examples are given showing that men on heavy work doing a nominal 66.7 hours (actually 58.2 hours) week had their time reduced to a nominal 56.5 hours (actually 51.2) the output per hour rose by 39 per cent., that per week by 22 per cent.* The eleven members of the board which drew up this report include only one trade union official. Its secretary is an Air Vice-Marshal. Almost every recommendation made by it has been deliberately broken, with disastrous results. The B.B.C. and the entire daily press, except the *Daily Worker*, supported this policy, which is now admitted to have had a disastrous effect on production. But it had a very good effect on profits,

* NOTE.—It does not of course follow that because a 48-hour week is best for heavy work, a 65-hour week may not be justified for very light, but skilled work.

under the cost plus 10 per cent. system. We can only achieve maximum production by following the recommendations of this report, which are based on the experiments of the 1914-1918 war.

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As regards politics, in the rather narrow sense in which this word is generally understood. Mr. Churchill has said that there are to be no recriminations. This does not of course apply to the Communist Party, who are always to be attacked, and to those who from time to time agreed with them, such as Mr. Pritt, who was thrown out of the Labour Party for opposing the sending of a British army to Finland 19 months ago, and thus losing the war.

I do not believe in 100 per cent. recriminations, for every politician without exception (including Mr. Churchill when he supported the Finnish expedition) has made mistakes in the past five years. But some have made little else but mistakes, and mistakes that helped Hitler. In war-time generals who make mistakes are or should be removed. The same applies to Ministers and Civil Servants.

The Cabinet still includes men responsible for the Munich policy, notably Lord Simon who in 1939 was responsible for handing over Czechoslovak gold to Hitler. Mr. Churchill correctly stated that it would come back in the form of bombs.

The Ministry of Home Security includes among its officials Mr. Asterisk or Sir Blank Asterisk (no one has been able to find out who is responsible) who designed straight trenches 90 feet long as shelters in 1938, and ordered brick shelters to be made with lime mortar in 1940, while refusing to build surface shelters with steel reinforcement until this summer, though many people (including myself) had been advocating them since November, 1939.

The Diplomatic Service is full of "experts" of this kind.

The Soviet Union is able to resist Hitler, among other reasons, because it eliminates people who make too many mistakes. I do not suggest that Lord Simon be shot. That is not our custom. I do say that his expulsion from the Cabinet would probably shorten the war.

Now mistakes are made through incompetence, and by listening to bad counsellors. One group of such counsellors is called the Imperial Policy Group, including Lord Phillimore and others. In April, 1941, they said that if Hitler attacked the Soviet Union the campaign would be over in four weeks, and Britain should avoid even 'the appearance of harmony'

with Bolsheviks. After Hitler's attack in June they argued against an alliance. These men should be shown up as public dangers.

We have more than a hundred million potential allies in the countries which Hitler has conquered, and fifty million or so in Germany and Austria. The question is if you were Czech, would you be prepared to risk your life at the bidding of a government including men who betrayed your country to Hitler in 1938? If you were a German worker, would you defy death for men who helped Hitler to smash the German trade unions, and now threaten to punish the German people through half a century for Hitler's crimes? For that is what Lord Vansittart's policy amounts to.

If I were a Czech, here would be the news on the British radio which would get me moving:

Lord Runciman, who persuaded your government to give in to Hitler in 1938, is now in custody for the duration of the war. Lords Simon and Halifax have been dismissed. The Czech M.Ps. interned in the Isle of Man have been released. Finally, in order to show that we are in favour of independence for all nations, we propose to grant India the same degree of self-government as Canada, Australia, or Eire; and the India (Emancipation) Bill is now before Parliament. Nehru and other Indian leaders have been released.

Mr. Churchill may dislike Communism, as Stalin dislikes Capitalism, but they have agreed to co-operate in the military field. If they are to co-operate in stirring up revolution in Europe they must co-operate in the political field. Here the Communists have set the example. Thus the French Communist Party has pledged its full assistance to General de Gaulle in spite of his past record, and some French Communists have already died in consequence. But Mr. Morrison will not release the Czechoslovak Communist M.P's. who voted against surrender to Hitler when members of the present Czechoslovak Government did so, any more than he will publish the names of the British peers and M.P.s' who belonged to Capt. Ramsay's society, the Right Club.

To sum up, the war can be shortened by complete national and international unity against Hitler and Mussolini. This means, for all concerned, association with former, and probably future, political opponents. It means the temporary surrender of valued rights and privileges. It means the ruthless scraping of men who put personal, sectional or even national interests before the supreme interest of freedom.

If you think I am exaggerating, listen to Lord Haw-Haw

warning one section of British opinion against the dangers of Communism, and then switch over to the Workers' Challenge warning another section against the dangers of Plutocracy.

Unity does not mean the absence of criticism. Mr. Churchill is not always right, as Hitler and Mussolini claim to be always right. Nor is Stalin, as he is among the first to admit. It does mean that criticism should be solely directed against activities or inaction which impede victory.

I believe that the entry of the Soviet Union into the war makes ultimate victory reasonably certain. But every hour by which we can shorten the war means a better world for us and our children. We can all help to shorten the war if we really believe that victory is worth any sacrifice, and act consistently on that belief.

THE APOLOGIA OF A PARISH PRIEST

BY MERVYN STOCKWOOD

ON the second Sunday after my induction, I went to church to celebrate the Holy Communion; finding no one in the congregation I disrobed and returned to my rooms where I tried to forget my disappointment by doing a Cross-word: I found that Torquemada presented fewer problems as compared with the puzzle of a parish which, while numbering approximately twelve thousand souls, was incapable of producing a single person at the Lord's Table. Nor was I particularly encouraged when a sympathetic neighbouring Vicar told me that apart from himself and the verger there had only been two people in his church for the chief morning service.

Those acquainted with conditions in the east-ends of our large industrial cities will not be surprised by such revelations nor will they seek a superficial explanation of the difficulty by attributing such failures to the shortcomings of the personnel, no matter how serious these may be. Similarly they will accept with reservations the suggestion that the impasse has been created by the futility of organized religion; ecclesiasticism is pitifully irrelevant, but it is doubtful whether the most drastic operations would produce a change for the better so far as empty churches are concerned.

I cannot attempt to arrive at an adequate diagnosis of a disease which is probably more deep-seated than any of us realize; the most that I can do is to reflect upon my five years' experience in the Ministry and to suggest things which have struck me as contributing noticeably towards the malady.

It is often assumed that the people of England are crying out for religion and that if only the clergy could devise some technique for commending the Faith to the man-in-the-street, there would be a large scale spiritual revival. I entirely repudiate such an assertion. As one who has undergone the discipline of the Cambridge historical tripos, I have learnt to treat with scepticism the view that there was once a Golden Age of Faith when most men were practising Christians—a belief cherished by the arty-crafty Mediævalist—but even so I question whether the nation has ever sunk to such a state of spiritual inertia as at the present. In the past the majority may have been indifferent to the things of the soul, but at least the need was outwardly recognized; to-day this sense of need

is almost absent and the practice of religion is regarded as irrelevant as the practice of snuff-taking, a harmless but unnecessary recreation for those who have the aptitude for it.

A realistic recognition of the position is essential because it will condition our efforts to overcome the difficulty. So long as we regard the British people as being fundamentally religious we shall fail to grapple with the real issue. Our services may be dull, our phraseology antediluvian, our liturgy incapable of meeting modern needs—all these things may be stumbling blocks, but I am convinced that if each could be surmounted we should be no nearer to a radical solution; in fact experiments in this direction more than prove this, for though stunt after stunt has been tried in the poorer parts of our cities to attract the outsider to brotherhood meetings and popular services, the results have hindered rather than helped. Soloists, bright hours, male voice choirs, may appeal to those who lack the courage to find their amusement in a picture house on a Sunday, but it is unlikely that they constitute a means for bringing them closer to God or for awakening a sense of spiritual need. If a parson's job is similar to that of a shop-keeper whose wares no one wants to buy, he had best recognize the position frankly and start to plan in terms of a long term policy rather than to attempt to crowd his shop with a host of uncertain customers for a bargain sale of cheap and shoddy goods, the quality of which will reflect credit neither upon himself nor upon his business.

For this appalling spiritual apathy into which our people have sunk, there are perhaps two primary causes.

- I. An economic system which is so constructed that it condemns those who live under it to a selfish bread-and-butter struggle which in turn, creates every obstacle to mental and spiritual development.
- II. A widespread ignorance as to the nature and function of the Church. The Society which Scriptural Theology demands should be the most disturbing and the most embracing, has in practice come to be regarded as the irrelevant craft guild of the piously minded. While I do not for one moment suggest that an Ecclesia which was true to its destiny would arouse widespread enthusiasm, yet it would at least challenge the spiritual forces which are latent—such as they are—and provide means whereby they might achieve expression.

First—The Economic System: Although few will be prepared to go the whole way with Marx in describing consciousness as the outcome of economic existence, yet we are compelled to admit the scope of the economic factor. Mr. Seebohm Rowntree's recent survey of working-class life in the

City of York proves conclusively that for thousands of people in this country, life is centred around the grim struggle with poverty and insecurity, a struggle which allows little or no time for other things and which casts a deep gloom upon living.* I do not think that the more fortunately-placed realize what this means when actually translated into terms of human living. I remember vividly the day I began my ministry in Bristol five years ago—outside my church were about fifty men lounging and gambling; I started talking with them and was told that some of them had been without work for ten years and that although they went down to the Labour Exchange regularly nothing ever turned up, and so they just had to fritter their days away in idleness, unwanted—until, as one of them said, “we have to go and fight for a freedom and a justice which we have never had.” Behind such a confession of despair I realized the futility and wickedness of such an existence, because for those who were condemned to endure it, life could never be anything but a prostitution of what God intended it to be. While I certainly do not believe that the Church’s function is to become exclusively identified with any particular political programme of social reform, my experience has convinced me that until we Christians have played our full part in working for a radical change in the ordering of society, our Gospel will be lacking in relevance; for to urge an unemployed man, who is haunted by malnutrition and insecurity, to live a full and abundant life is as futile as to suggest to a man with no legs that he should join a keep-fit gymnasium. Of course it is possible for the exceptional man to live a Christian life in spite of unfavourable outward circumstances, but that does not alter the fact that he is being denied the opportunity to attain to the spiritual mental and physical maturity which God intends for him; while for the man who is not exceptional, economic distress will probably result in the stultifying of such gifts as may be latent within him.

It must be remembered that in discussing this problem one is not thinking of a few isolated instances for—in normal conditions—there are literally thousands and thousands of our fellow-countrymen who, after an inadequate bringing up and even more inadequate education, are pitched on to the labour market at a ridiculously young age to take a few dead-end jobs before being consigned to the rubbish heap of unemployment; while there are many thousands more who although they are not subject to the degradations of the “dole” and the Means

*Poverty and Progress. By B. Seeborn Rowntree. Longmans, 15s.

Test are compelled to devote their energies to a grim struggle with insecurity.

Not only is such a state of society unjust and inherently wicked, but its efforts are such that a very large section of the community has no alternative but to be indifferent to all else but the fight for existence and if it looks for relief at all it finds it in escapist amusement and in escapist religion; in fact it is hardly an exaggeration to say that in Europe to-day the preacher of the Gospel might as well attempt to convert a mechanical robot as the twentieth century economic man. The tragedy is that as we clergy have a guaranteed income with a reasonable security and as most of us have never known and are never likely to know privation and want, we are almost incapable of appreciating the facts of the situation; we simply cannot see why it is that a man who has an empty stomach and an uncertain larder has little or no time for the things of God. We forget that when Jesus said that man cannot live by bread alone, He was not implying that therefore man can live without bread, for Jesus knew what many of us have forgotten, that the "abundant life" includes every department of a man's existence, the well-being of his body and mind no less than the well-being of his spirit.

I do not want to suggest that a change in the economic system is going to usher in the Golden Age—still less the Kingdom of God; what I am asserting is that the hard facts of parochial life have convinced me that it is well nigh impossible for a nation or for an individual to achieve a true destiny unless each man is going to be given a sufficient measure of economic security to enable him to live a full and useful life.

By economic security I mean something infinitely more comprehensive than higher wages and family allowances, for these in themselves are little better than ambulance expedients; rather we must think in terms of a "Service Community" in which all resources will be used for the benefit of the people as a whole and in which every encouragement will be given to each man to equip himself as adequately as possible so that he may contribute to the common good. In fact having begun to organize the national life for the art of war, we now need to go a step further and to develop that organization for the art of peace.

Second—The Function of the Church: Scriptural theology demands that the Church shall realize itself as a body of persons called out by God and dependent upon His initiative to be the means whereby His Kingdom may be furthered. In fact just

as the Nazi Party is the instrument for establishing the New Order, so is the Church of Christ the instrument for establishing the Kingdom of God. This contention which seems so obvious is practically unknown to the bulk of my parishioners; instead, if they think of the Church at all, they do so in the terms of an ambulance society or of an escapist religious club. Ambulance work will always have to be done and it is to be hoped that Christian people will never be slow to imitate the example of the Good Samaritan, dressing wounds and pouring in oil and wine—but dressing wounds is not the primary concern of the Church; instead she should assume the rôle of the surgeon who will remove the deep-seated disease so that there will be no exterior sores to dress. Welfare Centres for Unemployed are not to be despised; but it would have been infinitely better if those who devoted so much energy to the running of these clubs had used their brains to discover how the scourge of unemployment could have been eradicated. Of course such action demands courage and an unflinching integrity and it is here that we Churchmen have noticeably failed. We have sometimes talked big and we have mouthed vague platitudes about a better social order but for fear of upsetting the vested interests we have carefully avoided referring to specific evils. We have urged men to live as brothers but we have been afraid to point to those outrageous abuses in the economic life which make brotherhood an impossibility. It is mere humbug and fraud to say that the Church must not take sides in political and social matters; true the Church must not become exclusively identified with any one party, but she has every right to condemn in the name of God from the pulpit those injustices which cry out to heaven to be avenged, *and* to condemn by name those men who use their privileged positions to maintain those injustices. Not so long ago ministers of the Gospel pointed to the exploitation of black labour by the white owners and said: "In the name of God, slavery must go;" to-day ministers of the Gospel should point to the exploitation of wage labour and say "In the name of God economic slavery must go."

Some will argue that such a policy has nothing to do with the Kingdom of God; in which case, my answer is that the sooner they turn to their Bibles and find out what the Scriptures say about the Kingdom and about the function of Jesus and His Church the better. Of course the casting down of the privileged and the exalting of the lowly, the driving away of the rich and the filling of the hungry do not constitute the sum

total of the Christian Gospel: but they do at least form part of it and an essential part.

Others see the Church as a religious club. Like-minded people meet together to perform specific spiritual exercises just as those whose aptitude is for bodily development meet together at a gymnasium for physical exercises. For instance there is a school of thought in the Church of England which attaches the greatest importance to regular attendance at the Holy Communion but when one presses for an explanation of this rule, an answer is usually given which is utterly irrelevant and entirely non-Scriptural. Badly digested mysticism, a hard and fast ecclesiasticism which has made the Church an end in itself instead of a means to the end, other-worldly dope which uses the paraphernalia of religion to resign men to their fate, have all contributed to the screen which has hidden from men the true function of the Church.

There is, of course, a place—and an indispensable one—for what may be termed “personal religion,” for apart from any other reason, the Church will never succeed in obtaining a radical change in the nature of security unless the natures of her own members are radically changed. Hence prayer, meditation, Scriptural reflection, the Sacramental means of grace and anything else which strengthens the relationship between the individual soul and God and which enables a man to walk constantly in His Presence are parts of an essential discipline. In fact so far from wishing to be rid of rules, I think there is much to be said for a stricter application of them. The point is, what is their purpose? When a Christian attends Communion on Sundays and fasts on Fridays, he should be undergoing a discipline which has some object in view, for there is nothing in Scripture which remotely suggests that there is any merit whatever in observances as ends in themselves. When Christians gather around the Communion Tables of the world it is in order that they may—as a Church—become a better equipped instrument for the furthering of that New Order which Jesus founded; if the Sacrament fails to achieve this then for the communicant who willingly acquiesces in such futility it is nothing better than pernicious dope.

The Malvern Conference indicates both the strength and the weakness of the Church in the present situation. Under the chairmanship of the Archbishop of York, a fairly representative gathering of Anglican clergy and laity met together in January, 1941, to discuss many of the problems to which I have referred in this article. The hopeful feature lay in the widely expressed

desire that the Church should be true to its vocation and **take** the lead in applying the implications of the Gospel to national and to international life. As one who has had experience of numerous political and social committees, I was more than a little impressed by the knowledge and the sincerity of those who took part; for the general atmosphere was infinitely better than anything which I have experienced elsewhere. What, however, depressed me was the inability to suggest methods whereby the proposals could be put into practice. It is comparatively easy to say that the resources of the country must belong to the community and used for its benefit; it is more important to point out those features in our economic life which will have to go if the proposal is to meet with success. The vast capitalist combines have no objection whatever to the Archbishop's Conference passing revolutionary resolutions so long as they remain resolutions; but they would vilify the Church and attempt to smash it, if the Communion Tables became the rallying centres for an inspired community who in the name of God were determined to act upon those resolutions. Here I speak with some knowledge for in Bristol as a result of the outspoken lead given by our Bishop at the Church Congress in 1938 some of us Church folk have determined to take a definite Christian stand in municipal matters. Although our efforts have been spasmodic and lacking in coherence, they have aroused the bitterest opposition from some of the wealthy and privileged who have shown no scruples in using any and every method to get us removed from the city.

So we look to the future and in view of what I have already written I will attempt to analyse the situation briefly under five heads.

1. If the war continues for any length of time, the circumstances may become appalling. A population which is almost devoid of spiritual roots is likely to reflect the same irresponsible emotion which a desperate German people exhibited when Hitler made his mass appeal before coming to power. Should this happen, the Church will indeed have her back to the wall and her only course of action will be for Christians of all denominations to work together in small local communities, bearing witness whenever possible as a faithful remnant, hoping for the day when, the tyranny having passed, they will be free to fashion a new community. As a preparation for this the denominations should already endeavour to achieve a measure of reunion and if possible to realize themselves as a single unit. In my own locality the clergy and ministers are

already in constant co-operation for worship and work, and if the authorities are prepared to give each of us a fuller commission which will make our ministries acceptable to all parts of the Church, I see no reason why reunion should not become an accomplished fact.

2. If the war ends within the next two years so that there is no internal collapse, the Church will have a very real opportunity to bring pressure to bear upon the Government for a radical change in the ordering of society. Generalizations, however, will not be sufficient; the Church will have to demand specific objectives, indifferent to the opposition which will be aroused. Even now we should require that in the existing emergency such national requirements as railways, mines and armament factories should be run by the community for the community and not for profit. If we could obtain this in war time, we should have established a useful precedent for reorganizing the country for the arts of peace. This is a practical possibility for it is unlikely that the Government could dismiss a vigorous lead from the Archbishop of York which was supported by most congregations throughout the country.

3. Straight away Christians should endeavour to get as much control as possible into their hands, for in order to bring the influence of the Gospel to bear upon national life it is essential that those who believe in the Gospel should be in positions of executive responsibility.

4. Although it will take generations for the people of Europe to find their roots in the soil of the Gospel and although I do not expect any return to religion on a wide scale during this century, yet I am convinced that if the Church is fearless in taking such action as I have suggested, and if we achieve an ordering of society which will give to all men the opportunity to live a full and useful life then religion will once again become relevant and will at least become a challenging force in the life of the community.

5. In the meantime the Church cannot be too careful in reforming its own domestic life. Not only must we be ruthless in eliminating the unrealities and the corruptions which characterize so much of what we say and practise, but we must also be first and foremost men of God, men of unquestioned integrity, men with a passionate love for humanity, men who are prepared to take the consequences of an unflinching loyalty to Christ and to His Church.

(Mr. Mervyn Stockwood is the Vicar of St. Mathew, Moorfields, Bristol.)

MODERN PROSE FORMS

III. AUTOBIOGRAPHY AND REMINISCENCE

PART I

BY ERIC GILLETT

ON January 13, 1766, there landed in England, to the marked disapproval of Dr. Johnson, the man who might well be considered to be responsible for the shape and trend of autobiography as it is written to-day. Jean Jacques Rousseau came to this country at the invitation of the Scottish philosopher and historian, David Hume. Rousseau's mistress, Thérèse le Vasseur, travelled separately and was placed under the care of James Boswell. Rousseau was not a pleasant personality. He had remarkable capacities for being quarrelsome or suspicious. If you befriended Rousseau it was certain that you would have a tremendous row with him sooner or later, and even Hume, who was a good-natured man, could not avoid the inevitable. Before this occurred Hume managed to find a resting place for Rousseau in the country house of Mr. Davenport at Wootton in Derbyshire. He did not find it uncongenial and he wrote the greater part of his *Confessions* there, but Rousseau was an exception to the rule that the artist who manages to express himself fully in his work is generally an easy, agreeable person in the affairs of life. He could never rid himself of jealousies and suspicions and for the concluding years of his life, at any rate, there is no doubt at all that he was mentally unbalanced. In my opinion the *Confessions* are the source of modern autobiographical methods. It may be said that for many years the stream flowed underground. In this country Victorian prejudice was strongly against personal revelations but there is no doubt that the reign of Edward VII, with its more tolerant moral standards, paved the way for what was to follow. In that reign some amazingly trashy books of so-called reminiscences, which were issued as the work of elderly court beauties, and were probably churned out by hack journalists, showed the way that the wind was veering towards a frankness and freedom of expression. This had its

first serious and important manifestation in 1911, a year which saw the publication of the first volume of George Moore's admirably entertaining literary autobiography, *Ave atque Vale*.

Moore was an artist. So was Rousseau. When life did not give Moore the exact and exciting pattern which he thought to be his perquisite, he reshaped these unsatisfying experiences and turned them into something undeniably readable and something which their author might well be proud to have lived through and to have written about. It is true that Haydon and Trelawny had done the same kind of imaginative autobiographical writing many years earlier but their influence is not perceptible in George Moore's lively and sensitive recollections. There is no doubt at all that Moore subjected actual experience to a drastic process of transmutation, which kept his mind at full stretch as he compiled these *Irish Nights' Entertainments*. For all their apparent frankness the three books of this trilogy are misleading. They seem to be a free revelation of their author and of his friends. The style is flowing, one of the smoothest of contemporary styles, but it is the work of a consummate literary craftsman, who knew exactly what he wanted to do and did it to perfection pulling the wool over his readers' eyes whenever it suited him to so do. Sir Edward Cook writing about biography or autobiography remarked that the first chapter should always be omitted. In the past this was usually true enough but Moore begins his *Ave* as well as Shakespeare began his plays or Jane Austen her novels. The very first paragraph is an incitement to read on. It is characteristic of the author's narrative style:

In 1894 Edward Martyn and I were living in the Temple, I in a garret in King's Bench Walk, he in a garret in Pump Court. At the time I was very poor and had to work for my living, and all the hours of the day were spent writing some chapter of *Esther Waters* or of *Modern Painting*; and after dinner I often returned to my work. But towards midnight a wish to go out to speak to somebody would come upon me: Edward returned about that time from his club, and I used to go to Pump Court, sure of finding him seated in his high, canonical chair, sheltered by a screen, reading his book, his glass of grog beside him, his long clay pipe in his hand; and we used to talk literature and drama until two or three in the morning.

Moore realized fully the importance of being factual. In that short paragraph the scene is set as certainly as it could have been by Beerbohm Tree with all the resources of His Majesty's Theatre behind him. It is most convincingly theatrical. One is anxious to read on and discover what passed between Moore and his strange friend, the Irish dramatist, in

those midnight discussions in the Temple and so the appetite is whetted and the interest aroused.

There is a point about Moore's method which deserves mention here. He always gave the appearance of intimacy. As you read him feel that he withholds nothing, that he presents you with the man himself, naked and unashamed. In fact he gives you the man as he would like him to be. He is frank enough about his friends as he sees them. He is not afraid of caricature there. Yeats and Martyn are both sufferers. Of Moore you know comparatively little when you put down the last volume of the trilogy, except that he was a man of quick and swiftly varying enthusiasms and that he would wish to be known as a great lover. *Memoirs of My Dead Life* make that perfectly clear. If you are interested in problems of human psychology I think you will feel that you have been brilliantly spoofed. You have been stimulated and amused as well but you have been cleverly deceived. That is the final impression I get from Moore's autobiographical works. Between the publication of Moore's trilogy and the next important contribution to autobiography in English there stretched the war of 1914-1918, although it would be unfair not to mention Mr. Shane Leslie's *The End of a Chapter* with its glimpse of the Prime Minister, too good to be omitted here:

Churchill and Chamberlain bequeathed their sons to the Tory party. It would be difficult to say which created the greatest difficulty to that party—Winston Churchill by leaving or Austen Chamberlain by remaining. Winston I knew ever since he was the enfant terrible of the home circle. As a boy he was untidy, unmanageable and quick of speech. When he returned from Harrow with a torn jacket, he replied to all remonstrance: 'How should I not be out of elbows, when my father is out of office?' His adventurous spirit fastened on *King Solomon's Mines* for his favourite reading. He read it twelve times and once drove its author 'haggard' in the course of a cross examination. 'What did you mean?' he insisted on one disputed point, and the author confessed he did not know himself.

Once Winston was taken to the Tower of London, but declined both train or bus as too prosaic a means of conveyance. Finally he sent cheerful word home that he had started with a drunken cabman and a frisky horse. The secret of his soul is adventure.

Mr. Leslie should bring his autobiography up to date. His method is ideal for its purpose.

Post-war autobiography is so closely linked with journalism that it is essential to make clear the general situation before discussing particular books and authors.

There is no doubt that the last war left behind is a widespread desire for free and frank expression. It may well be that this

always occurs after a period when a keen and vigilant censorship has been in operation. Censorship often has peculiar results. If one channel is dammed, the water forces its way out elsewhere. When any repressive control is suddenly removed, there is always a scramble to exploit the new situation. After the restraints of Cromwell's time, there was an outburst of license in the theatres and elsewhere when Charles II. came to the throne.

After the last war the popular appetite for horrors had been whetted by experience and by the new conceptions of popular journalism held and practised by Lord Northcliffe and others. The great thing was to turn everything into a 'story.' I remember once being in a newspaper office in a country town when a young reporter came in flushed with triumph. He told the news editor that he had got his 'story.' I asked the news editor what it was. It turned out to be a report of the local flower show. Facts alone had ceased to be of importance. It was their presentation that mattered most. Lack of proportion did not count. The public must have its neat, horrid, and picturesque, but always patterned story.

About the same time the craze for celebrities reached the ridiculous heights upon which it has remained ever since. The popular press has been prepared during the last twenty years to give you the autobiography, or as they prefer to call it the personal story of every notability and notoriety, from the English centre-forward to the gentleman who has committed one or more murders or the gentleman who, most efficiently we hope, bumps him off.

This is admittedly a picture of the whole business at its worst. It is, in fact, the very worst of an aspect of journalism which has many redeeming features, which are inextricably mingled with the writing of autobiography as we have grown to know it. The sensational press employed and probably still employs competent journalists to write the personal stories of the hangmen and chorus girls and murderers about whom large sections of our avid public likes to read. 'Revelations' have been in the air for twenty years at least now. It has become the fashion for educated men and women to bare their private lives with a flourish. Only a few years ago at the Book Fair at Earl's Court a distinguished writer, who has specialized in including in his well written narratives of travel and diplomacy singularly frank admission of his love affairs, was sitting at a stall signing copies of his latest book, while a queue of ladies stretching for many yards, excitedly waited their turn.

There is a great deal to be said for freedom and frankness of expression but the more we can steer clear of vulgarity the better, and the trend of the times is undoubtedly towards vulgarity, and there are unfortunately at this moment a great many writers, journalists among them, who do not really know where good taste ends and where vulgarity begins. It is not their fault but it is their readers' misfortune. Often enough a gate is opened to admit all kinds of horrors by an author who is himself the most sensitive and reticent of men, but who feels that by putting on record his own difficulties and adventures he may be of service to his fellow men.

After a careful search among the post war autobiographies, of which it is obvious that I can only mention a small number here I have come to the conclusion that Mr. Robert Graves, the poet and novelist, really broke the post-war ice with his *Good-Bye to All That*, which appeared in 1929. This was the book which seems to have unsealed the lips of other writers. After it there poured out volumes of all shapes and sizes which vied with one another in frankness and outspokenness, but *Good-Bye to All That* is, I think, the most honest of them all.

Mr. Graves was thirty-four when he wrote it. He need not have wondered if 'it is justified as a story.' Here are some of the incidents in his life:

I seem to have done most of the usual story book things. I had, by the age of twenty-three, been born, initiated into a formal religion, travelled, learned to lie, loved unhappily, been married, gone to the War, taken life, procreated my kind, rejected formal religion, won fame, and been killed. (His name appeared in a casualty list under this heading). At the age of thirty-four many things still remain undone. For instance, I have never been on a journey of exploration, or in a submarine, aeroplane or civil court of law (except a magistrate's court on the charge of 'riding a vehicle, to wit a bicycle, without proper illumination, to wit a rear lamp.') I have never mastered any musical instrument, starved, committed civil murder, found buried treasure, engaged in unnatural vice, slept with a prostitute, or seen a corpse that has died a natural death. On the other hand, I have ridden on a locomotive, won a prize at the Olympic games, become a member of the senior common-room at one Oxford College before becoming a member of the junior common-room at another, been examined by the police on suspicion of attempted murder, passed at dusk within half a mile of Stromboli when it was in eruption, had a statue of myself erected in my lifetime in a London park, and learned to tell the truth nearly.

There are, too, Mr. Graves's war experiences which in the passage quoted he dismisses in six words. Many readers will find them the most interesting part of this most honest book. It is difficult to imagine that they could have been written in

the period before the last war, and it is entirely impossible that the description of Graves's wedding could have appeared in the discreet years before 1914:

Nancy and I were married in January, 1918, in St. James's Church, Piccadilly. She was just eighteen and I was twenty-two. George Mallory was the best man. Nancy had read the marriage-service for the first time that morning and had been horrified by it. She all but refused to go through the ceremony at all, though I had arranged for it to be modified and reduced to the shortest possible form. Another caricature scene to look back on: myself striding up the red carpet wearing field-boots, spurs and sword; Nancy meeting me in a blue-check silk wedding dress, utterly furious; packed benches on either side of the church, full of relatives; aunts using handkerchiefs; the choir boys out of tune; Nancy savagely muttering the responses, myself shouting them out in a parade-ground voice. Then the reception. At this stage of the War, sugar was practically unobtainable; the wedding-cake was in three tiers, but all the sugar icing was plaster When the plaster case was lifted off there was a sigh of disappointment from the guests.

Mr. Graves shows a really remarkable detachment in this account of a ceremony which has reduced far too many English writers, past and present, to a style bordering on slow music. There is a crispness and a realism here which are very telling. Mr. Graves has the noticing eye which must be a family possession. It has enabled a brother to earn considerable success as a journalist. It did not allow Mr. Graves to omit a small but revealing incident from his autobiography. At the end of his first term's work at Oxford he attended the usual college board to give an account of himself. The spokesman coughed and said a little stiffly:

I understand, Mr. Graves, that the essays that you write for your English tutor are, shall I say, temperamental. It appears, indeed, that you prefer some authors to others.

There is a world of humour in that remark and in its quotation. But then humour keeps edging in and there is besides frankness without cynicism. It is for these reasons coupled with the fact that the author is a first-rate writer and that his book was issued at a time when it seemed that autobiography had lost its full significance and was refusing a great opportunity that has made me write at such length about *Good-Bye to All That*. A recent reading has not made me modify this opinion.

It would be ridiculous to ignore other books in this kind written between the armistice and 1929, and two which must be mentioned were written by women. They were, I believe, the two most important autobiographies published during

these years. We must leave it to succeeding generations to decide whether Dame Ethel Smyth is better as writer or composer. It is unbelievable that the careful compiler of *Annals of English Literature 1475-1925* should have omitted her name altogether and it is to be hoped that the error will be put right in the next edition.

All Dame Ethel's books pulse with energy. Her's is an outstanding personality and she writes as she talks. Her interests are many and varied. Female suffrage, music, friendships, copious letter-writing, games and sports, all play a part in her life and in her books. She is one of those wise people who dislike labels. "Highbrow" and "lowbrow" are two states of mind to be avoided. A full pleasure in life in all its manifestations is the thing.

It is astonishing that the critics who have delighted to fling mud at Boswell and who sneer at him so patronizingly have always failed to understand that he succeeded because of his enormous zest for life. The best of literature has always been written either by people who have lived fully or who are so completely eaten up by some egotistical passion that they have built a temple out of an obsession.

Lady Oxford and Asquith's *Autobiography* belongs to the first of these two categories. "My only literary merit," she wrote, "is natural directness," but she has many other talents. She is a fine conversationalist and has met many people well worth knowing. Her book is vivid and imperious. It will be matter for the historians. Miss Vera Brittain's *Testament of Youth*, which appeared thirteen years later finds a place in the second category. On its dedicatory page is a quotation from Ecclesiasticus which shows Miss Brittain's purpose. It runs:

And some there be, which have no memorial; who are perished, as though they had never been; and are become as though they had never been born; and their children after them. But these were merciful men, whose righteousness hath not been forgotten . . . Their bodies are buried in peace; but their name liveth for evermore. The people will tell of their wisdom, and the congregation will shew forth their praise.

There is something in *Testament of Youth* which arouses in its readers either almost fulsome adulation or equally uncritical condemnation. I find both these extreme states of mind difficult to understand. Miss Brittain set out to do a clearly defined piece of work, she writes:

For nearly a decade I have wanted, with a growing sense of urgency, to write something which would show what the whole War and post-

war period—roughly from the years leading up to 1914 until about 1925—has meant to the men and women of my generation, the generation of those boys and girls who grew up just before the War broke out.

She adds that she wanted to give in addition an impression of the changes which that period brought about “in the minds and lives of very different groups of individuals belonging to the large section of middle-class society from which my own family comes.” Well, she has achieved her purpose admirably and within the definite limitations of her own personality. She has little or no sense of humour. She is inclined to be morbid about death and illness, disasters which she can face when they come with highhearted courage. She has a curiously proprietary air in writing about the war, which occasionally gives the impression that it is a different war altogether from that unpleasant affair in which one fought oneself. These things may combine to account for the unpopularity of *Testament of Youth* with some of its readers, but its merits far surpass its defects.

This book is a piece of personal history which gives expression to the hopes and aspirations of a whole class suddenly overtaken by the tremendous upheaval of the last war. The author was as painstaking as James Boswell himself in many of the precautions and preparations she had made before she wrote it. Correspondence had been preserved, all kinds of personal material had clearly been kept in readiness for some undefined literary purpose, which ultimately crystallized into *Testament of Youth*. It is a book written with a notably fine purpose, which is finely expressed at the book's end in a passage which deserves quotation:

To look forward, I concluded, and to have courage—the courage of adventure, of challenge, of initiation, as well as the courage of endurance—that was surely part of fidelity. The lover, the brother, the friends whom I had lost, had all in their different ways possessed this courage, and it would not be utterly wasted if only, through those who were left, it could influence the generation, still to be, and convince them that, so long as the spirit of man remained undefeatable, life was worth having and worth giving. If somehow I could make my contemporaries and especially those who, like myself, had once lost heart, share this belief; if perhaps, too, I could have children, and pass on to them the desire for this courage and the impulse to redeem the tragic mistakes of the generation which gave them birth, then Roland and Edward and Victor and Geoffrey would not have died vainly after all. It was only the past that they had taken to their graves, and with them, although I should always remember, I must let it go.

. . . . Under the sway
Of death the past's enormous disarray
Lies hushed and dark.

So Henley had written: and so, with my eyes on the future, I must now resolve.

There is highmindedness and a blazing sincerity in all that Miss Brittain writes which should inspire respect for her writings even in those who detest her point of view. These qualities are to be found in the semi-autobiographical study of Winifred Holtby, which Miss Brittain has called *Testament of Friendship*.

Even more remarkable in its way than *Testament of Youth* is the extraordinary life story told by Miss Mabel Lethbridge in her *Fortune Grass* which came out in the following year. To this young lady life is a drama and she writes dramatically and, to be truthful, at times melodramatically. There is some reason to suppose that *Fortune Grass* has a claim to be considered the most remarkable autobiographical writing by a woman in the English language. In saying this I have not forgotten the redoubtable Harriette Wilson who can relate the most scandalous incidents without shocking reasonably sensitive readers and whose career approximated fairly closely to that of Defoe's *Roxana*.

Miss Lethbridge enjoyed running wild in Ireland as a child and her adventures began when she found herself confined, not to say cribbed and cabined by the decorous boundaries of Ealing. And so, in the last war, at the age of sixteen she ran away to Bradford as a hospital nurse, made munitions and had a leg blown off. She has had countless operations. She has slept on the Embankment. She has trundled a barrel organ through the London streets. She was the first person to lend chairs at the pit queues. She has been a cook. She has run, and as far as I know, still runs a house agency. She has acquired a comprehensive knowledge of the London "gangs" and their customs, which deserve a book to themselves. With a little more restraint and literary skill this would have been a great book. As it is it remains one of the most memorable human documents I have ever read.

With *Testament of Youth* and *Fortune Grass* women had showed a grasp of the possibilities of autobiography which men might have found it hard to equal. It will be seen that during the last decade there were numerous writers who were both able and willing to take up the feminine challenge.

(To be concluded).

A FURTHER FRAGMENT OF AUTOBIOGRAPHY

By F. D. OMMANNEY

MY people were gentlefolk. Upon this earth-shaking assertion no false interpretation need be placed. I am not trying to explain to the reader how blue my blood is underneath this somewhat plebeian exterior for I am only a moderate snob and quite honestly do not care what colour it is. Such questions, of absorbing interest to so many, do not concern me.

At one time, however, I think I might have been called a snob with some truth. I seem to remember getting a kick out of knowing the right people in the suburb where we lived and by that, of course, I meant the rich people, those who lived aloofly in the big houses behind high walls overtopped by cedar trees as opposed to those who lived in small houses surrounded by low railings overtopped by privet hedges or by nothing at all, unashamedly open to the street. I also had intellectual pretensions, I think—especially at college where, failing to shine in the athletic sphere, I cast about for some less exhausting, more easily attainable sphere to shine in. But nowadays I realize that I am an average moderately, but certainly not exceptionally, well educated middle-brow. I think I must be that elusive individual “the man in the street.” My tastes and opinions—I hardly know them. As with most people, I suspect, they are mainly a collection of attractions and repulsions. At any rate at nearly forty I have no pretensions. The balloon of my youthful self-conceit has long ago lost all its gas, as indeed it should have by now, and floated gently down to earth. I have no particular social position, no wish to fill my address book with high-sounding names or to frequent fine houses that do not belong to me. No mantel-piece of mine has ever been a gallery of invitation cards. I have a fair number of friends with all sorts of tastes and inclinations who earn their living—or did before the war—in all sorts of ways. I have a little money, but only a little, and have earned it all.

So there I am. I can say with truth that I do not pretend to be anything that I am not. On the other hand I do not affect

to despise all these things that I do not possess, like the fox gazing at the grapes, for inverted snobbishness is the silliest variety of this harmless laughable vice. I should like to be better read and better educated than I am but from now on I expect I shall gain experience but not culture. And it must be fun to be rich, to move about in expensive and gilded circles, to be surrounded by beautiful things and decorative gay people. I enjoy lunching at the Ritz. I love the delights and graces of this world and sometimes sigh, as we all do, for a fuller, richer life than has been granted to me. But I know that, having got thus far with much but without a good deal, I am not now likely to add very much to myself. I might find a nugget lying in the street or someone might suddenly leave me a million pounds but I am afraid I should find these benefits less useful now than I should have, say, twenty years ago. So I must make do with what I have been given, as we all must in the long run, and not pretend to have gone farther or climbed higher than in fact I have lest I be one day compelled, publicly and with shame, to take a lower place.

And if, when I say that my people were gentlefolk, you object that I am using a long dead language, heard only faintly now in Kensington and Bayswater boarding-houses, reviving words that no longer have any meaning, or returning to a forgotten set of values now grown pathetic in decay, I can only agree. Yet, they belonged to the upper middle class.

My father's family were at one time tolerably well landed and tolerably well off. During the nineteenth century the male members distributed themselves liberally and fairly evenly among the honourable professions of the Navy, the Army, the Civil Service, the Law and the Church. Many of them achieved moderate distinction in these professions and rose to be naval officers and soldiers of fairly high rank, senior civil servants, prosperous lawyers and eminent, very C. of E. parsons. Knighthoods and honours descended upon them in a gentle shower. They were proud, class conscious, typical and looked upon the world as their oyster, which indeed in those days it was. They had large houses behind garden walls overtopped by cedar trees, enormous numbers of children and believed that not voting conservative was a sign of mental derangement. In their eyes commerce and trade were dishonourable and anyone remotely connected with them was beyond the pale. To obtain money by any means other than by receiving it as a fee, stipend, salary or legacy was looked upon as receiving it by false pretences. They were C. of E. ;

they killed things for fun; they read *The Times* and *Punch*. They were honest, upright, God-fearing, intensely patriotic in an inarticulate way, and not terribly intelligent. Intellect made them feel slightly uncomfortable. They held the reins of England in inflexible hands—or so they thought.

The female members of the family learnt deportment and fancy needlework when young, the pianoforte and a little French but no housekeeping or domestic science. They were mostly finished abroad and then returned to engage in a carefully veiled but none the less anxious, at times even delicately acrimonious, competition with each other and with the other young women of the neighbourhood for the prizes of the local marriage market. These were all young men destined for the honourable professions of the Navy, the Army, the Civil Service, the Law and the Church. When a girl secured one of these prizes she became the object of universal congratulation. She was held to have made a "good marriage." Whatever might have been the promptings of her own heart her future happiness and well-being were taken for granted and it was assumed that she would settle down in an enormous house, bear quantities of legitimate children and bring them up to be soldiers, sailors, civil servants, lawyers and parsons, to be C. of E., to vote conservative and to continue to hold the reins of England. And even if she had secretly preferred the young man who came daily to her carriage door to take orders for groceries such little seeds of desire were by all her training and upbringing quickly and easily suppressed. Indeed they never really sprouted at all or attained any life but lingered only as a certain coldness, a lack of real enthusiasm, for the oft repeated undignified performance inseparable from the production of so many red foetal-looking future admirals, generals, permanent under-secretaries, Queen's counsels and archdeacons.

These people and all those like them in their stately houses lived rigidly encompassed lives. For them society was divided by a definite but intangible line into two distinct and opposing sections—gentlepeople and common people, the high and the low, the rulers and the ruled. The former were their own kind who lived by means of salaries, fees, stipends or, even more Olympian, by inheriting fortunes they had not earned at all. The latter class were those who existed by means of wages, paid weekly in vulgar cash rather than monthly or quarterly by means of aristocratic cheques in sealed envelopes. Among these also were those who stooped to gain their livelihood by selling things, which, as everyone knew, was really a form of

swindling. It was next door to living by one's wits. To have wits to live by was slightly discreditable in any case.

The recipients of cheques drawn monthly and quarterly, the drawers of dividends on preference shares, the inheritors of unearned wealth lived in an exclusive Olympus where narrow lanes ran between high walls and where wrought iron gates gave glimpses of Georgian and Queen Anne houses amid smooth lawns. But down towards the river was another region of shops and trams and row upon row of villas where dwelt the recipients of weekly wages in cash, the people who sold things and even that mercifully submerged tenth who had no means of livelihood at all. Down to this Avernus in their carriages the Olympians swept daily to give their orders at the pavement edge without alighting. The fact that they were then really buying things that the less exalted were selling was as carefully disguised as possible and commerce was tacitly given the aspect of command and performance. Then their carriages swept them back again into Olympus, back to the groves of cedar trees and the striped level lawns where no sound but a distant murmur reached them from the underworld in which men bought and sold and worked and went ill-clothed and starved. But yet who knows what strange stirrings, what germs of ideas the young brought back from that world where the pace of life was higher and where blood ran thicker and more red? There it was, perhaps, that the girl, leaning back in her carriage beneath her parasol, learnt to drop her eyes before those of the young man who took her orders for groceries, and felt her heart give a sudden and strictly interdicted thump.

In order to preserve themselves from vulgar contacts and to guard their way of life from disagreeable intrusions the inhabitants of this sanctuary hedged themselves about with a barrier of conventions more formidable than a brick wall armed with spikes. This was carefully designed to keep the two classes apart and to ensure that those who inhabited the region of shops and villas down by the river remained there. For any dweller in that dim twilight to attain the rarefied air that was breathed higher up the hill was more difficult than for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle. A system of scrutiny, enquiry, formal visiting and card dropping made certain that no undesirable elements, no taint of common trade, no stranger from without the gates could gain admittance to the charmed circle. "One had to be so careful, don't you know." Relics of this system linger in country districts to this day I believe, but, looking back on it, it seems incredible that it could ever

have so universally existed or the standards upon which it was based have been those of educated Christians who went solemnly to church on Sunday to chant "Oh Lord, have mercy upon us, miserable sinners," and then emerged into the Sabbath sunshine bowing right and left to some, but pointedly ignoring others in the same congregation.

But with my father's generation a melancholy decline began. Slowly there came creeping insidiously up from the river companies and platoons of little houses. They formed up in rows and stood complacently where there had been green lawns. They were the advance guard of what would, in the not very distant future, become an invading host. One by one, but only very slowly at first, the great old houses began to fall on evil days. They became shabby and weeds sprouted in their drives. Patches of dampness appeared and spread on drawing-room walls. At last they fell empty and at long last they were broken up, their fair gardens given over to the spoilers. Boards appeared above the old walls looking impertinently over them upon the leafy lanes of that select suburb. They told a sad story to anyone who could read it, the story of a *Götterdämmerung*, the twilight of a caste.

This decline was greatly helped and accelerated by the last war but it was not entirely due to it. For even before its outbreak those promising careers on which some of my uncles found themselves launched, somewhat to their own surprise occasionally, through the influence of powerful fathers began to falter and show signs of sinking beneath the waves of rude ungentlemanly competition. My uncles mostly failed to make the grade. The pace was becoming too hot. Or else they just never got started at all, never got launched on that smooth sea which it was intended that life should be for them. The influence of those powerful fathers was on the wane. Only the fathers themselves retained any faith in strings and their ability to pull them adroitly, and in those suave letters—"I assure you that anything you may do on his behalf will be very greatly appreciated as a token of the long and harmonious, etc. . ." Early in the twentieth century these well chosen phrases were beginning to fail to ring bells in the right quarters. After the war, I suspect, the bells were no longer there to ring.

So it began to be discovered that professions less exalted than the Navy, Army, Civil Service, Law and Church offered hitherto undreamt of attractions. Other ways of gaining a living were gradually promoted in status and it began to be less despicable to buy and sell. Before many years had passed

it became highly enviable. Perhaps it was the girls who made that surprising discovery first. They found that you might be just as happy if you married a sanitary engineer, a butcher, a baker or a candlestick-maker as if you married a Foreign Office official. Anyhow your life was not likely to be more uninteresting and you might be richer. So the marriage market changed its character slowly but definitely as the twentieth century grew and all sorts of people became my uncles by marriage—motor engineers, salesmen, stockbrokers and people vaguely and ambiguously “in the city.”

And slowly, year by year, battalions and companies of little houses came marching up the hill from the direction of the river. The high walls fell before them. This invading host encamped on the smooth lawns, levelling the old homes and the stately trees or leaving them forlorn amid a sea of brick and slate. The place was changing so, my people said. There was hardly anyone left. And yet, in spite of the fact that there was hardly anyone left, more and more people from all the rows of little houses came pouring up the hill into the park, more every year. They came up on fine sunny days with their push-carts and their picnic baskets and their strings of children and sat down on the grass beneath the trees. They swarmed around the pond and kicked footballs on the level turf beyond it. Unfamiliar shouts and laughter grew louder in the summer air as the years went on and only in the evening when the park gates closed did a holy peace descend again with wreaths of mist that curled upwards from the water.

So we declined in wealth and power and position and the reins of England slipped from our hands. In the new, crude, vulgar world in which we found ourselves we were markedly less successful than we had been in the easier days. We were not good at this buying and selling business so that from being tolerably well off we presently became very badly off. And, as there seemed to be enormous numbers of us, owing to the philoprogenitive tendencies of the last generation or so, each of us inherited but little from the break up of the old homes.

Thus it happened that I and my generation were born into a kind of twilight. We inherited rather expensive tastes and an upper middle class tradition which made life difficult for us because we had not the means to carry on that tradition. We found ourselves in a world that had little respect for it unaccompanied by wealth. Not only did we inherit that fine old cumbersome, unpractical and somewhat threadbare tradition but also the picturesque idea of a world still divided into two

distinct categories of human beings, that sense of still holding reins that had long ago escaped our grasp, that pride and that class consciousness but also that uprightness, that devotion to duty and to the state. All of this was injected into us in liberal doses by elders who did not perceive how their world was changing or shut their eyes to change. Continual protests against what was said to be the deterioration of society assailed our impressionable ears. I for one, with the cocksureness of youth, felt convinced that, contrary to what my elders ceaselessly intoned, the world was really getting better and better. The up-and-up-and-on-and-on thesis is one of the innocent illusions of youth but, looking back now, I begin to see that my elders were not so wrong after all. Much has changed for the worse, there has been a lowering of standards and a decline of values everywhere since they were pushed off their pedestals.

Dethroned in their Wimbledon flats—taken “when my dear father died and the old place was sold,”—in their Bayswater and Kensington boarding houses they sit surrounded by fading photographs of people in wigs, robes, ecclesiastical regalia and elaborate old-fashioned uniforms. All these bear witness to past renown. Dear Cousin John, who was in the 17th at Quetta during the trouble with the natives, with his hand on his sword and his helmet on his crooked arm, grows yellower every year. Dear Arthur, who did so well in the Sudan, looks out from over his high collar upon a world smaller and less generous than the world he knew. A year or two ago, by elaborate research in Bayswater and Kensington, by diligent enquiry in Cheltenham and Bath and after long correspondence with Bournemouth, there was prepared an enormous scroll, the swan song of a retired admiral in Somerset. When unrolled it revealed itself as a family tree. There for the edification and enlightenment of many old ladies, retired admirals or generals and country parsons, were displayed, like the complicated diagrams that unfold at the end of history books, the intricate series of respectable conjunctions, combinations and copulations that finally culminated, among other surprising results, in the production of me. This mountain, which had produced this mouse, lay on the top of my wardrobe for a year or so collecting dust. I do not know where it is now.

I was always rather scornful of this business—as soon as I grew old enough to have a mind of my own about anything. In the world I found myself growing up in I saw that it was more blessed to be rich than genteel, that however much you might wish to know the “right people” they did not particu-

larly want to know you unless you were one of them yourself. This you could never be if you were impecunious and all the grand conversation in the world, all the dark pictures in gilt frames, all the old medals on velvet cushions, all the photographs of people in regalia could not cancel out the fact that you had no money. High flown talk about grand relations now dead and portentously unrolling family trees had a dead and hollow ring for me and I soon learnt that reflected glory is a poor substitute at best. And I wished that the soldiers, sailors, civil servants, lawyers and parsons had been butchers, bakers and candlestick makers. I wished that my aunts had married their grocers.

THE LATEST GERMAN OFFENSIVE

BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR CHARLES GWYNN

BEFORE these notes can be published it should be possible to assess the extent of the success or failure of the new German offensive towards the Moscow region.

For the moment one can only review the events which led up to it and the strategic motives which seem to have dictated the operations.

In the original German onslaught Moscow was evidently the main objective—or rather the destruction of the army covering the Moscow region and the Russian central reserves. The defeat of those forces would have entailed the severance of the main communications with North and South Russia and the loss of a great industrial area; while the capture of the city itself would have had great morale and propaganda effects, together with the disturbance of the central control of the other Russian armies and processes of further mobilization. Once the Russian Central Army had been defeated those on the flanks could have been dealt with in detail.

When Timoshenko brought the central thrust to a standstill it evidently became necessary for German strategy to develop on new lines. I have, however, always felt that it would be with the ultimate object of producing conditions which would permit the resumption of the original plan.

The offensives against Leningrad and through the Ukraine had in themselves objectives of immense importance, but neither could be exploited to its full extent without considerable risk of meeting a formidable counter-offensive so long as the Russian Central Army and reserves were in full and growing strength. While, therefore, these offensives might achieve results important in themselves it seemed possible that they were to a great extent preparatory operations leading up to one which, even if not decisive, would enable the operations on the flanks to be exploited to the full.

As preparatory operations these attacks would at least have the effect of neutralizing Voroshilov's and Marshal Budyonny's armies and render them incapable of bringing pressure on the flanks of a renewed German thrust in the centre. No doubt the Germans hoped also to draw Russian central reserves to the flanks, since the outcome of the present offensive must depend largely on the strength and standards of equipment of the Russian reserves not yet involved.

The Russian stand at Leningrad and their ability still to counter-attack both from within and without the German investing positions, may considerably affect the scope of the new German offensive; for von Leeb does not appear to be in a position to contribute to the weight of its northern arm, though he

may have released a considerable number of air units. The reverses Marshal Budyonny has suffered on the other hand, have probably entailed heavy demands on the Russian central reserves; and though, temporarily at least, he appears to have checked the drive towards Kharkov, in the Poltava region, that may only mean that the Germans are prepared to wait for the issue of the central operation before committing Rundstedt's army to a further advance; preferring to use it for more direct co-operation with Von Bock. Meanwhile Rumanian, Italian and Hungarian troops can be used to strengthen positions won in this region and to take part in subsidiary operations where there is no danger of meeting counter-attacks on a scale which might develop into something approaching a counter-offensive.

The timing of the attack on the Crimea is somewhat difficult to understand in view of its synchronization with the new offensive. Possibly the Germans may have counted that, in view of the importance of Sevastopol to the naval situation in the Black Sea, Marshal Budyonny would receive reinforcements to enable him to relieve pressure on the garrison of the Peninsula.

It is of course possible that the Germans have sufficient resources to maintain the Ukraine offensive on a considerable scale, and a continuance of the offensive there would undoubtedly have a considerable indirect effect on the central situation.

Provided that it has not unduly exhausted his reserves Marshal Timoshenko's counter-attacking policy during the past weeks was fully justified. It must have delayed and disturbed German preparations, and to some extent it set back the starting line of the offensive. His success against the preparatory drive towards Briansk was evidently of special importance.

Marshal Timoshenko's record up to date gives us confidence in his capacity as a commander, and the fact that recently his counter-attacks have been on a smaller and more localized scale would seem to indicate that he was alive to the importance of not exhausting his army, in view of German preparations which could hardly have been concealed.

No method has yet apparently been found to check at the outset penetration or enveloping movements by armoured forces. The wide extent of front and the mobility of Panzer formations must combine to make the points at which penetration will be attempted, or enveloping movements started, difficult to discover. The defence cannot be strong at every point, and reserves for counter-attack may not be immediately available. Heavy losses may be inflicted by artillery and anti-tank weapons on the Panzer troops while effecting penetration, but the depth of penetration probably depends on petrol and ammunition supply. Supported by motorized infantry and artillery they are then able to retain the ground they have won unless they can be counter-attacked promptly by reserves having equal qualities of mobility and power. Whether Marshal Timoshenko has reserves of that character in sufficient numbers to ensure their prompt and effective counter strokes, must be doubtful. If he has not then presumably the problem becomes one of gaining time to concentrate reserves, by closing the gap made by the penetrating force;

thus preventing the enemy's infantry and artillery masses exploiting it to extend and reinforce the salient made before a counter-attack in force can be organized. Penetrations by Panzer formations probably have a more immediate disturbing effect on the communications and organization of the defence than wide enveloping movements. The latter however constitute a threat difficult to deal with, because, though they may be checked, concentration of counter-attacking reserves to a flank takes time; and, moreover, the advance of the enemy's supporting troops, probably motorized, may encounter little resistance. So far as the present operations have gone the wide enveloping movement on Orel, if it is strongly supported, opens a new line of attack, manifestly dangerous. On this occasion the Germans appear to have reverted to the strategy employed in Poland. By penetration they aim at enveloping and isolating portions of their opponent's army, whether standing defensively or in retreat, while at the same time developing a turning movement of much wider scope. In fact aiming at envelopment in depth, to meet which the defence would need two echelons of reserves. One to deal with penetration and the other to oppose a wider turning movement.

Marshal Timoshenko has before now shown capacity to deal with penetrations and the moral qualities to escape their paralysing effects, but it is uncertainty as regards the numbers and state of equipment of Russian reserves still immediately available that is, of course, our main source of anxiety. A correspondent of the *Red Star*, the Russian military journal describes the movement of a Russian reserve army, still apparently a long way off.

It is conceivable that the Russians have had in training a reserve army, awaiting complete equipment and intended for counter-offensive operations next year—the possibility of a counter-offensive must have been contemplated as it is the logical corollary to the scorched earth policy. Lack of equipment, and limitations imposed by communications on the size of the armies which can be employed in the combat zone, may have prevented such a reserve, if it exists, being brought into action up to date; but the crisis may have necessitated the use of at least such part of it as can be adequately equipped. If such a reserve army has been in process of formation it would probably be far in rear of the combat zone where it would escape air attack and not cause a strain on the lines of supply of the armies engaged. The appearance of a large force of fresh troops, even if below the highest standard of equipment, could not fail to have great effects on the present situation, for the German armies must be feeling the effect of exhaustion. Too much reliance cannot however be placed on the *Red Star* report, because to a single observer the movements of only a few Divisions may give the impression of a great force.

We can hardly hope that American and British aid will for some time be on a scale to affect the situation. Russian morale, however, appears to be wonderfully maintained, and the mere fact that there is a prospect of assistance must help to sustain it. The impression produced on our airmen by the condition of the Russian air force, the excellence of its equipment and quality of its

pilots is highly encouraging, as is also the fact that our small R.A.F. contingent has been able to improve even on the ratio of respective losses reached in the battle of Britain—an indication that although Germany may have been able to maintain numerical standards of production no marked improvements in design on a large scale has been effected. Guerrilla activities, in spite of the ruthlessness of German counter-measures apparently continue undaunted, and the further the Germans advance the greater will be the scope for their action. Still the crisis is on and it will be difficult to breathe freely till we can be certain that it has been safely passed.

The scale of the German offensive after the exertions made during the last four months affords an amazing example of organizing capacity and of human endurance ruthlessly exploited, but it seems inconceivable that the effort can be very long maintained if Russian resistance continues stubborn. Weather conditions may vitally affect the issue. M. Maisky is probably right that the Russian winter will not bring operations to an end, but mud in a wet autumn cannot be without effect on operations as mobile as those now in progress. Hitler admits that this must be the last major offensive in Russia this year and if he cannot achieve his main object of disrupting and completely disorganizing the Russian armies it will entail a failure disastrous for him, despite successes he has undeniably achieved. He claimed, and probably thought for a time, that he had disintegrated the Russian armies in the earlier phases of his offensive, and he may again be disappointed.

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Meanwhile the reorganization of our Middle East forces into two armies is an indication of our growing strength in that area. General Wilson's army in Syria and Palestine has obviously become a reserve army whose presence must support Turkish resistance to German pressure. The Army of the Nile is presumably considered powerful enough for whatever rôle is given to it in Libya. On General Wavell and India falls the task of improving communications in Irak and Iran and of ensuring the safe transit of material aid to Russia by every available route. The exploitation of the route from Quetta through Meshed is an indication of energy and that no possibilities are being neglected.

SPEED AND SHIPPING LOSSES

BY ADMIRAL SIR HERBERT RICHMOND

SINCE the publication of the figures of losses of shipping was stopped last June all we know is that there has been a notable reduction in the sinkings. But though things are so much better, and our defence improves in quantity and quality almost daily, it is no less true that we are not yet out of the wood. The losses are still formidable—whether construction has yet caught them up seems doubtful—and we have also to be prepared for increased efforts of the enemy in the winter and the early spring if he frees himself from his embarrassments in Russia and can turn the full weight of his malignity upon us.

One element in this most important problem which has greatly occupied the attention of many sea officers is that of the speed of our merchant ships. It is heartrending to hear of great convoys crawling at 6 to 7 knots across the Atlantic, harassed, sometimes for days in succession, by submarines whose speed is perhaps in the region of 16 or so knots and which could easily be outstripped if our ships had the speed. Is it not practicable to produce faster ships than those with which we now conduct our traffic? Possible as it is that, from the strict but narrow view of the "paying speed in peace," the policy of the cheap slow trader may be economically justifiable, it is still far from clear that we should not serve our interest better in this time of crisis by building faster ships. We do not hesitate to adopt any means, however costly, of defending them by a number of means and measures. We sail them in convoys which necessarily slows up the trade and reduces the carrying power of our shipping, we build destroyers and sloops, corvettes and cruisers, for their protection, we fit some with catapults in order to use fighter aircraft against the attacking bomber, we arm the ships themselves and give them such protective armour as circumstances admit. But we appear to fight shy of incurring the cost of giving the ships the speed which would shorten voyages and increase chances of escape. Because our ships are so slow their voyages take a longer time and they must spend more days and nights in the zones infested by submarines and aircraft; and those zones are constantly expanding. The slower the ship the less able she is to take any avoiding action against the track of a torpedo or the fall of a bomb. Slower voyages mean fewer voyages, fewer voyages mean a less fruitful use of tonnage. Lord Rotherwick, the President of the Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom, observed in February of this year that "one sixteen to seventeen

knot ship is equal to two of the Government "box" type which cannot be depended on to keep up more than seven to eight knots at sea. The fast ship can do two voyages for one performed by the slow ship, and the call on destroyers already overworked, would be greatly reduced as these ships would not require to be convoyed."

In defence of the "box" type of slow speed it is claimed that she can be built quicker and more cheaply than the sixteen or seventeen knot vessel—the ship of the speed required to escape the submarine on the surface; and that giving her more her speed would not free her from the need to sail in convoys, so the advantages of the extra speed would be lost. Moreover, our workmen are accustomed to the building of the slow ship and the construction of the engines, and that experience results in faster production. On that last point, and on the degree to which our builders and designers are capable of adapting themselves, only those fully acquainted with the problem can express an opinion: but so far as loss of speed in convoys is concerned it is not necessary to assume that the value of the higher speed would be lost. In the last war convoys were of two types, slow and fast, the faster being composed of the twelve to fourteen knot, and the slow of the eight knot ships. As to whether the faster ships could, as Lord Rotherwick said, sail independently of convoys, this would depend upon two things: whether their speed would prove sufficient to outpace the submarine that may make her appearance in the coming months, for it is not to be supposed that the limit of the submarines surface speed has necessarily been reached; and whether the single ship, with her own armament alone, can beat off attack by aircraft which one must expect will be working before long—if indeed they are not doing so already—from the French West African coasts and the coasts of Spain and Portugal, and in larger formations than those we encounter to-day. Secondly it would depend on the degree of danger from surface attack. Speeds of the higher figures mentioned will not suffice to escape from the faster armed vessels of the enemy and still less from the "regular" cruiser with her thirty knots. If and when the enemy comes into full and unchallenged possession of the port of Africa and the Peninsula, an extensive cruiser warfare in mid and south Atlantic would at once begin: indeed the principal object of an extension of the German arms into those territories would be precisely to obtain oversea bases for commerce warfare, the lack of which, according to several German Admirals of the last war, was the principal cause of the failure of the cruiser campaigns and one of the predominant reasons for the demand of the return of the colonies. It was necessary to convoy the ocean trade in the latter part of the war and it is hardly open to doubt that it would again be necessary to-day. The conception of what have been called "protected lanes" is in my opinion impracticable. It is certainly possible to patrol a comparatively limited area; that has always been a method of protection at all times; and it may be possible to do so along a limited stretch of a route (the track down the coast of Portugal was so patrolled at one period). But when such long

stretches of travel as an ocean route are concerned this is not possible to do with any prospects of its being effective. One may divert shipping from the route so that in the immensity of the waters its discovery by an enemy is so slight that he is unlikely to waste his efforts in looking for it, but there are great areas, such as the offing of the African salient, in which ships can cruise and, with the aid of air scouting, can have considerable expectations of locating ships, as we see them doing now, and of bringing up surface squadrons from the base in that region. In such danger zones convoy would be a far more effective form of protection than cruising and the security of even the faster types of ship recommended would depend on their being convoyed through those "focal" areas.

That, however, is one aspect only of the question. Even if a higher speed would not divest us of the need for convoy it would, as remarked earlier ease the burden of tonnage and of the defending ships and vessels of all types. And it has an important tactical factor. The most common form for the defence of a convoy against surface attack is for the defending ship (or ships) to put herself in the path of the attacker and fight her, covering the merchantmen against her while they make their escape on a different course either in company or spreading on several courses. So the *Jervis Bay* acted in her brave and memorable action; it was in accordance with an old and unforgotten tradition. Then, the benefit of speed in the merchantmen is obvious, for the more water they can put between themselves and the enemy the better their chances. It is in a sense an equivalent to a longer opposition by the escort.

The question is affected by the extent of the dangers from each of the types of attacking instruments that we have to guard against—the submarine, the many types of surface vessel from the battleship and battlecruiser down to the destroyer, submarine and motor boat, the aircraft and the mine—the last named does not affect the question of speed but the volume of its depredations needs to be noted. What is the exact percentage of damage done by each is known only to the authorities concerned, though a good many guesses have been attempted. It would probably not be very far out to estimate that something between fifty and sixty per cent. of the losses, measured in tonnage, has been due to the submarine and that the remainder is more or less equally divided between the other three weapons. The figures necessarily vary from time to time—they must have risen sharply in the category of the mine during the time between the first employment of the magnetic mine and the discovery and application of its antidote—and the cruise of the battle cruisers to the westward increased for the time the percentage of losses due to surface ships. The acquisition of the African and other bases would not improbably favour the surface ship attack more than those of the other two types, but this can be speculation only for much depends on the ability of the enemy to supply his forces in those oversea positions. Both submarines and aircraft would also benefit from the use of those positions so possibly the proportions would

not greatly alter unless the enemy should succeed in inflicting some heavy losses upon our surface squadrons. Whatever may be the situation, speed which will enable shipping to pass more quickly through the areas, whether infested by surface ships, submarines or aircraft, would be of marked assistance to the business of defence.

Shipbuilding policy at this time must of course be governed by the needs of the immediate present. It may be that, viewed from all its angles, there is something approaching a balance between the two policies: obviously there must be much to say in favour of the "box" type in the matter of producing the tonnage we urgently need in the shortest possible time or that policy would not have been adopted when the advantages of speed are so plain. If there is such a nice balance, the future may be called upon to settle the decision. There can be very little doubt that when this war is over a new war, a war of freights will begin. We have seen how certain foreign Governments have supported their merchant fleets with subsidies of various kinds, direct and indirect, the direct taking the form of bounties for speed. If our merchant navy is to be restored to the position it used to occupy and the position it ought to occupy in the national economy, it must receive some more effective help than that which was doled out to it in the legislation of recent years. True as it is that the record of nationalized shipping is deplorable and that the last thing which the trade of this country could stand would be the nationalization of a business which depends, as the business of shipping does, upon individual enterprise, initiative and freedom from the paralysing hand of a Government Department, it remains true also that the foreigners who have increased their shipping at our expense have done so by these measures and that the private owner cannot compete single handed against such powerful forces. Subsidies for speed could be given, as subsidies for certain other matters, mails for instance or for fitness to perform the duties of armed auxiliaries, have been given in the past without any form of nationalization. We do well to remember that though we pride ourselves of the growth of our marine under the influence of private effort and initiative, we were faced with very little competition from abroad, except from the Dutch, and their competition had the weight of the States General behind it. And even with this comparative lack of competition we found it necessary to stimulate the growth of our shipping and our seamen by Acts of Navigation designed specifically for that purpose: the well-known Navigation Acts of the Commonwealth were by no means the first of such Acts which extend back as far at least as the 14th century. It would surely be foolish to ignore these things. We speak of "key industries" and extend protection to them. Both peace and war should by now have made us realize that shipping is a key industry of the first order.

THE EFFICACY OF STRATEGIC BOMBING

BY AIR-COMMODORE L. E. O. CHARLTON

THE combatant nations in this great war have now, at the commencement of the third year of hostilities, had a large and variable experience of bombing. It is not inopportune, therefore, to conduct a cool inquiry as to the results, assessable from outside sources only, of this form of attack on the respective war machines. It is not intended specifically to include sporadic raiding of the hit-or-miss variety, as when, for instance, the people of a seaside town are awakened to the sound of falling bombs from a single aircraft overhead. Nor will it be considered necessary to bear in recollection those occasions on which the attacks have been so thin, and so widely dispersed, as obviously to present a nuisance value only. The aim will be instead to aggregate the effects of persistent and prolonged bombardment from the air, for such expense of energy bespeaks a pre-determined large-scale effort, and whether the objectives be harbour shipping, areas of heavy industry, munition plants, or merely civilian 'morale,' the very weight of the offensive in such cases has been evidently directed to produce the disablement of an enemy's war potential, or the complete discouragement of the crews that work it.

Certainly there is very little to be gleaned from either side's official pronouncements on the subject. With the alteration of dates, place-names, and peculiarly racial turns of speech, these are, in point of fact, practically interchangeable. Bombs of whatever nationality appear to fall, with the impartiality of rain, on churches, cinemas and private dwellings, on civilians, preferably women and children, but never on or near objectives directly or indirectly related to the national war effort. It is evident that they must fall somewhere, and it is equally apparent that they must do damage when they fall within the confines of a closely built-up area. The truth is, of course, that complete silence would be ineffective, if not directly damaging to the several interests at stake. For it would enable the opposition to pile Pelion on Ossa in a pyramid of uncontradicted falsehoods, and would, at the same time, give rumour her head and convince the citizens that the enemy depredations were too ineffable for mention. In the difficult circumstances, therefore, both sides do the best thing possible. They refuse admission that their war machine has suffered hurt of any sort, and are apt to be loquacious, for the purpose of inverted propaganda, in description of the wanton injury to innocents. It is obvious, however, that in many cases these innocuous disclosures conceal a larger truth.

The obverse of the official bulletins, the side concerning claims in contrast to admissions, again shows the enemy and ourselves as like as two peas in the

matter of assertion. In each case the bombs are seen to fall in the target area, fires break out the glares from which may be seen for miles, buildings crash, and pandemonium reigns below. Surely, if such claims could ever be substantiated in the light of expert testimony, there would be not one stone left on another in the areas affected; and if industry at large were the sole target of assault, the war machines in either case would be seriously out of true. And yet the production belts maintain their steady motion, and the wheels of war continue to revolve; the result being that we, on the one hand, are assured that output is increasing, while the enemy people, on the other hand, is informed that over-production will necessitate a stoppage of the works concerned, the fog of war itself, in the very heat of battle, being less dense than the mist enveloping affairs at home.

One thing at any rate has been put beyond all doubt. The destruction of civilian hearths and homes, short of a holocaust that would rob the war machinery of the hands that drive it, is both unprofitable and useless as a means of waging war. The population is well-keyed by now to the circumstance of war, and the discomforts or displacements inherent to that condition are accepted for the sake of the cause, and with the reservation that, some day, Hitler shall suffer for it. Grief, anxiety, or a sense of outrage, merely stimulate the worker to ply his task with greater speed, even the visitation of death being accepted with philosophical calm as a merciful riddance in a weary and war-worn world. And this also must be taken into account; as long as the German people remain convinced, under the bludgeonings of propaganda, that their cause is just, so long will it, as well, withstand the impact of the bomb. For as far as it goes we adopted the right policy in concentrating effort on the factory and the munition plant, instead of striking at the individual in his home.

But now we are confronted with a situation which, at the commencement of hostilities, would have passed belief. For nearly five months, ever since Soviet territory was invaded, we have, weather permitting, been pounding Germany with bombs in a large-scale, and well-planned, effort to render aid thereby to Russia and divert the attention of the Nazi bombers from the Eastern to the Western front. With this object in view we have been exclusively attacking those vital spots connected with the Nazi war supply, and have religiously refrained from knocking over blocks of flats. We have lost considerably on these ventures, but the glowing picture of results achieved has upheld our firmness to continue. Strategic bombing has been put on trial as never before!

The strange thing has been, however, that our efforts have not provoked the enemy to a like activity, for during the same period Britain has been practically immune from bombs. It is more than certain that Hitler has not had bombers and to spare for the prosecution of his air war on both fronts simultaneously. That is not the point! The remarkable, and disconcerting, fact remains that the Nazi war establishments have been subjected to a ruthless air bombardment by the whole weight of our growing bomber fleet, and yet, to all appearances, their wheels continue to revolve. So little, in fact,

have they, apparently, been damaged that the enemy has not thought it worth his while to batter ours in return, even at the cost of lessening his strokes elsewhere, and so endeavouring to redress the mischief he, himself has undergone. What then is the explanation? Are we dealing futile blows? Has the hour of the bomber struck, and will the local air and ground defences, neglectful of reprisal measures, be sufficient answer for the future?

There is at present no certain answer to this conundrum, and we must, perforce, remain satisfied with problematical dividends upon investment. It is mathematically certain that a sufficiency of well-directed bombs will put 'finis' to the war. But when will that ideal be accomplished? And in approaching it how are we to forestall the previous arrival of the enemy? It is becoming more and more a lesson of experience that a specific target area must be constantly attacked if it is required to blot it out. Human hands, and the ant-like qualities of men, can make the most effective use of respite to restore a given situation. A succession of non-flying nights can undo completely the good that has been done. The necessary distribution of attacks involves long periods of immunity for the lately well-bombed objective, during which it can recover its position as a cog on the circumference of a wheel of war. If real and lasting good is to be looked for from strategic bombing, then there should be, it would appear, sufficient weight of bombs to keep the main objectives pinned, and so perpetually out of action. The process must be one of strangulation, rather than of body blows, and the windpipe must be compressed until life becomes extinct.

There is a further reason, more particularly applicable to the enemy, why we do not seem to reap a richer harvest from the bombs we sow. Over a period of years he has prepared for this eventuality, and has accumulated enormous reserves, which in consequence are at many removes from the factory sources of supply. On such reserves he can draw freely while the damaged plants are being restored, possibly not even being sensible of the jar of interruption occasioned by the temporary stoppage at the source. But oil, and its derivatives, are his real 'Achilles heel,' and if we had launched our missiles, from the very first, at those sole sources of supply, braving the opinion of neutrals in doing so, we could have carried out the principle of pinning down and, in a manner of speaking, cut off his gas at the main.

THE FORTNIGHTLY LIBRARY

EBB AND FLOW—A BOOK COMMENTARY

BY STEPHEN GWYNN

IT is always interesting, and in wartime it is something more, when a literary talent proves to have uses outside the region which is called pure literature. All who read Mr. David Garnett's *Lady into Fox*, a good many years ago, have known ever since that he had remarkable powers as a writer. But I at least did not know that he had thrown himself into aviation as a man might into yachting; and even if I had read books by him on the subject I should still not have guessed that he could write anything so masterly as his *War in the Air*;^{*}

**R.A.F.
Writers**

Mr. Garnett has the true faculty of exposition; he can see events as a related whole, developing out of beginnings which must be made as plain as the developed consequences, and yet without tedious elaboration. He has also a fairness which does not invariably accompany such talent—Mr. Chamberlain in particular is treated almost with indulgence. The book will enable readers to understand vividly that earlier period with which Mr. Chamberlain was concerned, and not less vividly the Mediterranean campaign, up to the point when Crete was still being defended. Mr. Garnett is excellent in his tributes to the Navy; action that passes on the land makes less appeal to him. But his theme is the Air Force, in which he has served, and he strikes me as illustrating well that force's character—showing how generally it follows the best traditions of the other services, and also bringing out the ways in which it is forming new standards. At all events, after reading that "personal record of the Battle of France," which is signed *Fighter Pilot*,[†] I found no discrepancy between Mr. Garnett's generalizations and the detailed account of adventures and emotions, given by an individual in the thick of action. *Fighter Pilot* writes of a period which Mr. Garnett passes over very briefly, and necessarily he gives us no general view of the war. Even the flying man's experience was bounded by what he was able to see. That, heaven knows, was not cribbed and confined; anything up to thirty thousand feet overhead and anything to be reached at three hundred miles an hour within an hour's flying, came within range. As to variety of adventure, within the space of a fortnight (possibly less), the unnamed author was shot down three times, twice 'baling out,' and on the third occasion after a serious wound, only just managing not to be burnt alive in the plane. He is much too frank to conceal that this possibility scared him badly—though it was at the end of a fight in which he had brought down three Germans. If there are many such pilots in the R.A.F., Mr. Garnett does not overpraise them—and could not. It is a generous book; and one pleasant thing is that this young man mentions going to confession as a good tonic—and says, later, that "the thought of the Cross" was always there, and always comforting. He says these things, not quite as he notes the agreeableness of getting a drink or a bath—but as simply and as naturally as he comments on a fine sunny morning.

Of course for us of an older generation it is all like the account of a Rugby

^{*}Chatto & Windus. 7s. 6d.

[†]Batsford. 6s.

football match to one who has never seen football played. Still, even the dullest comprehension can follow hairbreadth escapes and can realize when the risk is being consistently understated. I like also the young man's attitude to the French—both soldiers and civilians; he spoke French easily and was the better judge. I like his attitude towards his German opponents—both in what he approves and what disgusts him. He makes us feel that his squadron came unwillingly to their conclusion, "There's no getting away from it—they are s, aren't they?" That was after seeing refugees whom the German aviators had machine-gunned on the roads.

* * * * *

What the Germans are doing now, not in the hurry of war, but in a cold policy of terrorism, is, if possible, uglier than their butcheries from the air; yet probably throughout Europe there is a mixture of rejoicing even where the horror is most keenly felt, for men are challenging martyrdom rather than submit to tyranny.

Modern Martyrs

Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Norway have led the way; and now France also stirs—France, which had been paralysed by the action of her most trusted Frenchman. A story reaches me which will rejoice those who love French literature. In Vichy itself a representation of *L'Annonce faite a Marie* had been arranged; and for the occasion M. Paul Claudel, it was known, had written a curtain-raiser. But only the actor charged with delivery of the lines knew what was coming—nothing less than an address to Marshal Pétain, in which, my correspondent says, the dramatist had spoken out "like the great Christian and great patriot that he is." In the hall there was dismay and rage among the official promoters, while tumult scarcely concealed enthusiasm and delight among a good part of the audience. Needless to say, publication of the text was forbidden; but no one ventured to take any steps against M. Claudel; Vichy has not attained to Germany's disregard for certain decencies.

Yet Vichy's control is limited; and in France to-day hundreds must be facing a dreadful calculation. Martyrs are needed, but how many can France afford? For those who will offer themselves are those whom France can least spare. And the same reckoning must go on in Poland and in Czechoslovakia, where indeed the Germans appear to be deliberately picking out the highest values, to exterminate them. Miss Storm Jameson has written finely in these pages of the "writers' duty."* It is lucky for us who need not face the risk of death when we attempt it; but in France, in Norway, Belgium and Holland, many a writer may yet have that to consider; and some have already made their grim choice. There is this ground also for thankfulness. We, living in freedom among ourselves, do not need, as the French do, as certainly the peoples of Poland and other countries do, to look forward to a day when the dawn of liberation will be the signal for throat-cutting. Revenges, that have the character of executions, which now cost a martyrdom, will then only be too safely achieved.

* * * * *

After all, the peace and good fellowship which reign throughout this island are a very notable phenomenon; or perhaps it is the absence of such good fellowship in the sister island that should be matter for surprise. Here is a book which brings a real contribution to the understanding of that strange amalgam which we call the British people. *Tudor Cornwall*† by Mr. A. L. Rowse, makes me aware that in Shakespeare's time people in the Duchy

A Forgotten Foe

*THE FORTNIGHTLY. October, 1941.

†Cape. 18s.

habitually spoke a language just as different from English as Welsh or Gaelic. At that period Norden, in a Description of Cornwall, wrote that the Cornish people "seem to yet retain a kind of concealed envy against the English . . . a kind of desire for revenge for their fathers' sakes." They were Celts who remembered that they had been conquered by "the English." And the English were Saxons who had been conquered by Normans. But what Cornishman now remembers that his fathers had been conquered? The distinctive language has gone, that is true, but scarcely more thoroughly than in most Irish counties. In Wales, where the Celtic language keeps a far stronger hold than Irish has anywhere, there was presumably the same resentful memory of conquest as in Cornwall, but I see no desire for revenge "for their fathers' sakes" among the Welsh. On the other hand, Norden's phrase, used nearly five centuries ago about the Cornish, fits to-day a very considerable proportion of the Irish. Why? Mr. Rowse does not attempt, of course, to answer that question, even indirectly; but his immense labour of delving into local records of the Tudor time throws up chance details which illuminate all the history of both these islands. Why did the resentment disappear so completely in that "small conquered country on the remotest outskirts of Europe," when it lasted in Ireland? One reason certainly is that in Elizabeth's day when Cornwall was just as obedient as Devon to the English throne, England was still arduously at work to subjugate Ireland—using very largely troops from Devon and Cornwall. They were raised, they were led, by West Country gentlemen, whose fathers had been Catholic, but who owed great part of their estates to the spoils of Church property. These gentry were the active part of the community, the innovators; the conservatives were the peasantry who wanted to keep their old customs—above all the traditional religion. The peasants certainly had no wish to fight in Ireland, but the gentry were able to make them fight, and were willing for two reasons. One was that Ireland offered chances for land grabbing; another, more serious, that Ireland was involved in the European effort, led by Spain, to re-establish the Catholic Church in Britain, and that would mean forcing the holders of Church property to disgorge. Meanwhile, the English with their talent for compromise, left the Cornish peasantry all such customs as had not a political bearing—local merrymakings and celebrations. Cornwall accepted this, yet Mr. Rowse makes one feel that Cornwall never really took to the Anglican way of religion. It had been Catholic, without vehemence; though in the last days of the struggle Cornwall was a chief recruiting ground for the forlorn hope which kept the Catholic flag flying, mostly in continental seminaries. When the Cornish zeal for religion took a Protestant form, it was an extremity—just as in Wales; ceasing to be Catholic, it became nonconformist. But beyond yea or nay, Cornwall while remaining Cornish ceased to bear "envy" to England.

We are paying to-day in both these islands for the misdeeds of the past. Yet I welcome from Mr. de Valera even his guarded recognition of the loyalty with which Great Britain observes its pledges to the ambiguous entity that 'Eire' has become. Ireland is not 'Eire,' but Ireland is disunited as never before in my long life. The only possible complete reconciliation of Irishmen in Ireland lies in a complete fellowship with Great Britain; Mr. de Valera and his colleagues deny the fruition of this to uncountable Irishmen and Irishwomen. A proposal made in *The Times* by General Sir Hubert Gough would go some way to appease a craving; it is for the formation of an "Irish Brigade" (I use the words as they are used throughout Ireland) in the British

forces. Probably it would surprise Mr. de Valera to be told that General Gough is more unquestionably Irish than himself; or that General Gough is an Irishman who detests the disunion of Ireland and takes a practical step towards re-knitting old ties. Mr. Churchill has never lacked imagination but he lacks leisure to apply it to the case of Ireland; it would be well if someone in the Ministry (for it is not really a War Office problem) would consider with sympathy the proposal made by an Irishman whose name recalls so much in Irish tradition.

* * * * *

Mr. Leslie Marchand, who belongs to the Faculty of English in the University of North Carolina, presents what he calls "A Mirror of Victorian Culture" in his historical study of *The Athenaeum*.*

**A Victorian
Review**

whose personality was so well-known in the later Victorian and Edwardian period, would have been grateful to Mr. Marchand; for the book is a notable tribute to his grandfather—the man who really made the *Athenaeum*. One of the pleasantest things to remember in Dilke's life is the affection which linked the young politician to the old bookman. "Scholar" is not the right word to describe either grandfather or grandson; but both combined immense reading with outstanding abilities. As regards the politician, this is an inadequate phrase, for Dilke was among the ablest men of his time; but however busy he was, he never failed to read the proofs of the *Athenaeum*, in the years when it was being edited by Norman MacColl—that "Scotch Solomon," as he called him. But Mr. Marchand's concern is with the part played by Dilke the First, who took over in 1830 control of the paper which had been started in 1828 by Silk Buckingham, but in a few months passed into the hands of F. D. Maurice. In these first years it was really an organ of "the Apostles"—a "Cambridge Group" that included Sterling, whose life Carlyle wrote, and Arthur Hallam, the subject of *In Memoriam*. Dilke, already known as a critic and antiquarian, was among the finders of funds for the venture—a losing one, until he took charge of both the business side and the literary. He found success by reducing the price from eightpence to fourpence, and by establishing a reputation for perfectly honest judgments; draconic in his rule against favouring the wares of any particular publisher. Reviewing was carefully allotted to competent hands, and though not many of those who worked regularly for him attained eminence, they included men and women, some of whom, such as Lady Morgan and George Darley, showed at times a touch of genius. Mr. Marchand's book recalls many half-forgotten names—yet some of them less forgotten than he thinks, for instance R. C. Trench, one of the original band who is better remembered by his *Study of Words* than as archbishop of Dublin. But the main interest of the work lies in its review of contemporary estimates—both of the men whose lives had ended or were ending when the *Athenaeum* began (Shelley and Keats, in particular) and of those whose whole careers passed under its observation—from Tennyson onwards. There is too little detail about its reviews of foreign writers—in which Dilke made the paper specialize. But at least we get the very curious fact that he commissioned Heine to write an article on German literature, and then decided not to print it. The thing was too strong meat, even for so courageous an editor, in Victorian England.

*University of North Carolina Press. \$3.50.

INDIA AND DEMOCRACY, by Sir George Schuster & Guy Wint
Macmillan. 12s. 6d.

There never has been anything so extraordinary under the sun as the conquest and still more the Government of India by the English; nothing which from all points of the globe so much attracts the eyes of mankind to the little island whose very name was to the Greeks unknown.

So Alexis de Tocqueville wrote some eighty years ago. The authors of the present work might well have taken the words of the great philosophic statesman of France as their text, though, in fact, they do not quote them. Let me confess that I embarked on the task of reviewing this book with some reluctance. Having written a good deal about India in recent years I was, perhaps, a little tired of the subject. I was further repelled by the association of the word 'Democracy' with India. Nor did the plan of the work attract me. The book is divided into two parts written independently by two writers. Part I is described as a "Survey," and surveys are apt to be arid. Part II, more or less based upon the Survey, is mainly a forecast of policy.

Notwithstanding my misgivings I had not read many pages of Mr. Wint's "Survey" before I was completely absorbed and fascinated by it. It is, indeed, a very remarkable piece of work, as interesting as it is important. Not a page of his analysis is dull: he writes brilliantly but without straining after effect; he goes to the roots of the problem without turning up too much earth, and is quite exceptionally happy in illustrating his points by analogies drawn from many sources. He wants, for example, to bring home to English readers the unique position of the Brahman in India, the complexities of Brahmanism as a social system, and the paradox presented by the Brahmans who "having ceased to form anything like a

priestly college" and no longer performing in general any priestly function "have continued to command a genuine if grudging respect." An analogy is found in the position of "the clergyman in a country such as England." A spectacle somewhat analogous to Brahmanism would, writes Mr. Wint "be presented if in England all sons and remote descendants of clerics were entitled, without study, without the need of seeking ordination, and without performing any sacerdotal functions, to inherit the same regard."

Again: We have Mr. Gandhi, of whom Mr. Wint writes both frankly and sympathetically, described as "a kind of Oriental General Booth." Congress leaders in general are "no less nervous about their following than are, say, film-stars." *A propos* of the deadlock produced by the refusal of Congress leaders to co-operate with the Provincial Governments, "a Parliamentary system can no more continue than can a cricket match if one side declines to bat." The grant of parliamentary institutions to an ill-prepared people is a transaction which "suggests the gift of a powerful and complex engine to a child." How unready many of the newly-enfranchised are for the intelligent exercise of the franchise is illustrated by the report of a Bengal Commissioner who relates how "peasants left the polling booth disconsolate because they could not vote for God, the collector, or the King Emperor," and so on.

These quotations are far from exhausting the plums in Mr. Wint's pudding, and there is plenty of dough as well.

In Part II, written by Sir George Schuster, there is a much larger proportion of dough, and some of it, notably in an interminably long chapter (71 pages!) on Economic and Social Policies is, to be frank, rather "stodgy." Sir George is not only an exceedingly able adminis-

trator, but a very earnest reformer, and, like many earnest persons, he is in danger of becoming rather tiresome by over-emphasis and constant iteration. This is not to suggest that his contribution is not full of good stuff. On the contrary it will amply repay the most careful reading and will suggest very grave reflections. The text of his sermon is that India is likely to be landed in great trouble if her Government pays exclusive attention to the demand of "industry for protection and does not concurrently improve agricultural productivity and, more important still, the education of the masses, industrial and agricultural." But there are many other topics treated with conspicuous lucidity and sanity. No short review can, however, do justice to one of the most interesting, important, and fascinating books I have lately read.

It has one unforgivable defect. To publish such a book without an index is discreditable both to its authors and its publishers. My opinion of the importance of the book may be gauged by the fact that I have compiled an index for myself!

J. A. R. MARRIOTT.

ECONOMIC PEACE AIMS, by Oswald Dutch. *Edward Arnold*. 12s. 6d.

When peace comes the European economic system will be in ruins. The immediate problem of relief and readjustment will compete for attention with the greater problem of permanent reconstruction; and the solution of the one may hinder that of the other. Mr. Oswald Dutch tells us to prepare now with a well-defined scheme, set out in stages, capable of immediate application after the end of hostilities. He brings to his discussion an intimate knowledge of Central and Eastern Europe, even if not so intimate an understanding of economic truths, and his arguments in favour of pro-

ducing some such scheme now are attractive and convincing.

His scheme itself perhaps deserves a more mixed reception. Europe's troubles, he says, are due to the post-1919 break-up of its economic unity. Therefore we must have a European federation (with limited but highly important participation by Great Britain) to lay the foundations of a new prosperity. Defeated and victorious nations are to be equal members of the federation, though Nazis and Fascists are to receive the utmost punishment for their crimes. The leading principles of the new system are to be complete freedom of movement for men and goods, and governmental responsibility for full employment.

On the question of freedom of trade and migration Mr. Dutch is explicit and emphatic, but not more than necessary. He is not amongst those Free Traders who timidly hope for the establishment of their system in their grandchildren's time. He wants it immediately after the war. This is very sound. For at the end of the war the claims of French peasants, East Prussian landowners, Birmingham manufacturers and the like will not be for simple protection but for help in making the adjustment from war to peace. Why not force them to adjust themselves to a Free Trade world at once, before they can get their second breath and hold up the establishment of freedom? There will never be so fine an opportunity to lay the foundations of the new world aright as when, at the end of the war, everybody will be prepared for sudden large-scale changes.

Mr. Dutch's proposals for employment and investment, however, are more dubious. It is true that he refuses to be stampeded by the magnificent fight of the Russians against Hitler into endorsing their economic system. He recognizes some of the virtues of private enterprise. But

he is very inadequately informed concerning the problems of investment and pricing in the kind of system which he proposes. One delicious statement on page 146 illustrates his naiveté.

The State (and thus all States co-operating in the world economic plan) has only to ensure that each year its industries (i) do not produce too little so as to force up prices artificially, (ii) do not produce too much and thus cause an economic crisis through over-production.

Now his weakness in this field is important, for it can destroy the virtues of his plan. What destroyed the economic unity of Europe was not, as he contends, the Peace Treaties. One thousand sovereign states would not have impaired European economic unity if they had been ruled by Cobdens, though this is not to say that even Cobdenite independent states would not have been undesirable. Nor, on the other hand, is one great Federation or Empire a certain safeguard of economic unity (as witness 18th-century France). The real evil of our times is the popular desire for things incompatible with economic unity. Moreover we do not need freedom of migration over international boundaries only. We also need freedom of migration over occupational and industrial boundaries. As long as the public cherishes that kind of economic security which is obtained at the expense of freedom, progress and unity (and this covers most popular demands concerning wages and employment) it will fail to achieve the lasting security which Mr. Dutch wants. But his production scheme as here expounded would be quite likely to promote these popular prejudices.

The style of Mr. Dutch's writing is rather flat and the book would improve with pruning. Nevertheless it remains a useful contribution to its subject.

A. SHENFIELD.

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HITLER'S WAR MACHINE, by Wilhelm Necker. *Lindsay Drummond*. 12s. 6d.

THE FIGHT FOR THE PACIFIC, by Mark J. Gayn. *Bodley Head*. 10s. 6d.

With characteristic German thoroughness Dr. Necker lays bare the anatomy of the Hitler War Machine. The layman in military affairs can read his book with ease and our military chiefs should read it with profit. It is a fact too regrettably clear that the vast majority of people, high and low, have never realized either the magnitude or the nature of the military machine we were to be called upon to fight. It is even doubtful whether even our leaders yet comprehend the full significance of the vast changes wrought in the nature of modern warfare by the development of the German war machine.

Dr. Necker makes a potent criticism of other countries which must include our own, when he says "While other armies were still trying to adapt weapons to organization"—the Germans were adapting organization to weapons. So revolutionary a change completely transformed every department of warfare. The infantry could no longer be relegated to "footslogging." They had to be put on wheels. Cavalry had to become tank and motor corps. Two dimensional warfare was superseded by three dimensional. Maginot lines became as archaic as the medieval city wall and the war of movement and devastating firing power replaced the war of positions.

It has taken many disasters to impinge these facts upon our minds and we are far from having drawn the necessary conclusions in relation thereto. Dr. Necker therefore renders us a distinct and valuable service by showing us so completely the structure of the German war

machine and the strategy and tactics which flow from it. He is by no means overwhelmed by the new developments. He shows the weaknesses in the great machine which almost automatically established the co-operation of every arm of warfare in one huge operation. When he wrote his book he had not the Russian experiences upon which to draw but his criticism of the French in the battle of France is based upon their failure to apply the same principles of defence in depth as are being applied by the Russians. He is convinced that these principles provide the foundation of the strategy that must be applied to smash the Hitler War Machine.

The Fight for the Pacific sweeps us into the larger arena of power politics to which the military machines are necessarily harnessed. While at the present time our attention is rivetted on the gigantic conflict raging in Europe it is as well to remember that the first shots of the Second World War were fired in Manchuria as far back as 1931. It was not generally thought so at the time, when Sir John Simon so ably explained the pros and cons of the invasion of Manchuria that many people were led to believe that the Japanese were really engaged in rescuing the Manchurians and the Chinese from their own wickedness.

Mark Gayn who in his manhood became the correspondent of the Washington Post was born at Barim, a tiny Mongol-Chinese town at the foot of the Khingan Range, not far from the Soviet-Japanese battlefields of 1935-39. Of American stock, he has spent most of his life in the Far East and roamed over the vast region from Japan and Siberia into the depths of Southern China. He writes with vigour and power. He knows what he is writing about and has given us a book which is at once readable and reliable. He examines the history of the struggle in

the Pacific and reveals the aims and ambitions of the powers involved. He has much to say in criticism of British and American policy in the Far East and regards Japan as an enemy of civilization—a "go-getter" of imperialist aggrandisement.

Mr. Gayn is convinced that the Far East has reached zero hour. He says:

At almost any moment may come one overt act that will start a "declared" war merging all other Asiatic wars into one tremendous holocaust. This in turn will automatically become part of the World War pattern. The stakes in the fight for the Pacific will be different from those in Europe, but the general division of the combatants will be the same . . .

Mr. Gayn is not too clear as to where Russia would figure in this struggle, although throughout the book he shows Japan and Russia as enemies destined some day to fight out their enmity to a finish. But he was greatly influenced in his estimate of the situation by the "neutrality" phase of Soviet foreign policy and was not sure as to whether Russia would be in the fight when Britain and America come to the show-down with Japan. Life has however answered that question for him and for others. Nevertheless, Mr. Gayn's book is one of the best yet written on the lay-out of the Far Eastern conflict of the Pacific Powers.

J. T. MURPHY.

FORGIVENESS AND RECONCILIATION, by Professor Vincent Taylor. *Macmillan*. 10s. 6d.

Professor Vincent Taylor is one of those rare Christian scholars whose merits are such as quickly to win for him the position of standing so far above all the denominational barriers that for him and his readers they are no longer apparent. He is one of the two or three universally accepted guides of all those, of what-

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ever Church, who want to understand the bearing of the New Testament teaching on the problems of the day. His *Jesus and His Sacrifice* gave him this authority. His book on the Atonement underlined it; this present work emphatically endorses it. To read *Forgiveness and Reconciliation* is to see, as neither of the earlier books quite made one see, just where the professor's great strength lies. It is not merely in the care and exactness of his New Testament scholarship, though that is naturally part of it. But it lies far more in the astonishing way in which he seems to be able to keep his head above, and his judgment unclouded by the passionate Christian controversies of the moment. A considerable majority of Christian thought to-day is being poured into the effort to persuade the Church to know and to claim its social heritage. But the whole tone of this persuasion is rapidly becoming propagandist, and thus violent, exaggerated, and extreme. It is the issue of the moment. But in Church history, momentary issues have a habit of remaining momentary. Yesterday, for instance, the issue was the quest of the historical Jesus; and the day before that, it was the content and obligations of churchmanship.

The intellectual fashions, in fact, change; but what is changeless is the terms on which and in which the New Testament proclaims and offers the Gospel. It is of these changeless verities that the Professor always writes; and in this book he goes straight to the great Latin names of the graces which the New Testament writers offer, Justification, Reconciliation and Sanctification, explaining precisely what each one of them meant according to the general consensus of the teaching of Jesus Himself and the New Testament writers. That is to say that his business is with that which

is eternal and timeless, that which underlies all the shifting emphases of Christian opinion in this generation or that. For him, a very careful exactitude is the goal, and style is purely secondary; but the style is good for all that, and it rises from time to time to a certain majesty. He has, moreover, a happy knack of fixing in the memory the gist of the many pages he has devoted to the comparing of this text with that by winding up with a single stabbing and pregnant phrase. He spends, for instance, many pages in demonstrating that the teaching of Jesus depends on the doctrine of Christ, and finally drives it home by adding: "His teachings have wings because they come from Him."

Only towards the end does the professor turn to deal with that which perplexes us so much to-day, the social implications of the New Testament. But his detachment is creative because one feels that anything he has to say about it is built on a foundation of such patient and exacting care and accuracy as to give his words an unquestioned authority. He has a section at the end on *Sanctification and the Community*. It does not say in different words the same sort of thing that Mr. T. S. Eliot says, though that is because the New Testament does not at any point—not even in *Ephesians*—address itself precisely to Mr. Eliot's problem. But it does emphatically drive home the truth that no one who teaches the authentic Gospel can stop short at the individual when he deals with redemption, not even though he must always start there. "What appears to be an exhortation to the individual is seen to be a call to the community and to the individual as a member within it." For the New Testament, the community is first and foremost the Church. To-day we cannot quite so limit it, but we are not true

to our foundation documents if we forget that communal sanctification is to be sought in the Church first, and until it is found there it certainly will not be found anywhere else.

ROGER LLOYD.

TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING, by Gilbert and Elizabeth Glen McAllister. *Faber & Faber*. 12s. 6d.

It is a commonplace that never before in Britain has there been such lively awareness of the need to plan—but, so far, the blitz has stimulated only vague emotions based on the limited range of evident facts and experiences. The positive transference of emotion into mass conceptions of policy will not come to pass merely because of bomb experiences. For this we must depend on politicians, using the word in its highest possible sense, and the scientific and technical skills which underlie modern political action.

Lacking this direction the word "reconstruction" has become dangerously near to being a vapid, meaningless cliché used to cover utopianism—definition of objective without study of the means to attain it, or narrow reformism—expedients without planned objective and integration with the related aspects of social life.

England has had its belly full of reforms and the greater part of Mr. & Mrs. McAllister's book, a very salutary nightmare picture of the result, would be even more useful than it is if the authors showed themselves aware of the inherent characteristics of reformist planning instead of just shocked by its results and were less inclined to propose yet more equally transient reform under the stimulating but inadequately analysed dictum that we must "plan for the needs of the family."

It is true, as they effectively show by a vivid and critical array of facts

and figures, that drastic surgery is needed to make British towns, villages and country decent to live in, but it all ends with the rather complacent presentation and re-presentation of one pattern of reform evolved by the Garden City movement and the delivery of congratulatory pats on the back for Lord Reith, Sir Montague Barlow and Mr. Justice Uthwatt in so far as their proposed adjustments of planning law and organization tend toward the ideas of the Town and Country Planning Association.

"We are what we are because of where we are" is the axiom with which the book starts but there is no exploration of the antithesis that we are where we are because of what we are. The analysis is indeed entirely materialist but undialectical. There is little consideration of the fact that planning and the fundamental existence of the opportunity

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to plan depends on the will to plan, and that the stimulus to a will to plan among the great mass of the population depends largely on other things than argument à la Uthwatt or on the nine agreed points of the Barlow Commission Report or the National Planning Basis of the Town and Country Planning Association.

The book's outstanding merit, viewed as a tract for the times, is its confident and unhesitating treatment of things as they are. The survey it gives is well informed and sharply critical. The description of the evils of our towns, of the impotence of our past efforts and the constant and ineffective calls for action that have been made by social reformers pile up into a picture which is bound to excite attention and lively concern among all the book's readers, lay and professional. No one can fail to be moved by the spirit of enthusiasm with which the authors demonstrate their loyalties even if at times one must hesitate to approve the use of figures to prove parts of their argument in a propagandist rather than a scientific manner, and the deluding flattery—much as one might wish that it were true—of sentences such as: "the recommendations of Mr. Justice Uthwatt should provide at last a complete and coherent solution to the problems of national planning" and "existing legislation has . . . served to create a strong body of trained technical town planners who rank second to none among public servants . . . in capacity and zeal," a remark that obscures the fact that the inadequacy of planning personnel in numbers and full scale experience commensurate with the tasks in front of us is one of our most alarming handicaps. The book shows the unconfused simplicity of an act of faith: significantly it is the first book on planning to be published since the blitz made people

aware that "something must be done." The McAllister's were able to be first off the mark because long before the war they were all ready with their bags packed to start for the great new garden city England. They are among the fortunate who, it would seem, have nothing to learn; the garden city adherents just *know*. The great unsolved problem of the spiritual and aesthetic assimilation of contemporary ideas into the visible furniture of living that has been brilliantly explored by Professor Giedion in his recent Charles Eliot Norton lectures* at Harvard means nothing to them. The implied condemnation of the characteristic British urban development of Bloomsbury, Clifton, Cheltenham and Edinburgh New Town may be a disaster of incalculable effect.

We have such great lee-way to make up that every simple, enthusiastic and informative presentation of the problem must be welcomed and read but readers of this book will lose none of its spirit and fire if they realize that almost every page is conditioned by its authors' single-eyed concentration on one planning theory.

EDWARD CARTER.

*Published by Harvard, University Press and Oxford University Press.

RUSSIA AND OURSELVES, by Victor Gollancz. *Gollancz*. 2s. 6d.

SOVIET RUSSIA, by E. Strauss. *The Bodley Head*. 12s. 6d.

WAR AND PEACE IN SOVIET DIPLOMACY, by T. A. Taracouzio. *Macmillan*. \$4.00.

RUSSIA ON THE MARCH, by J. T. Murphy. *The Bodley Head*. 3s. 6d.

Of history there are roughly two views current in our time. There is the traditional moral and metaphysical view which builds on the mystery of human life and inter-

prets events through the good and evil motives of men, and often incorporates such interpretation into an impartial scientific view. And there is the materialist conception of history.

Since Russia is a Marxist country, and has not only adopted the Marxist view of history but sought to build a whole new society on its basis, it looks rather different to Marxist historians than even to the friendliest outsiders. Hence those bitter controversies around Russia which lead to such fratricidal impulses as are exhibited in the four books on my list.

Mr. Gollancz believes in a revival of the evangelical I.L.P. kind of socialism and, while discussing Russian foreign policy, has at the back of his mind the 'moral law' which derives from the 'Judaeo-Hellenic tradition'—through 'the teaching and practice of socialism, with its passion for objective truth, and of Christianity, with its belief in the sacredness of human personality, and in the right of freedom which is its corollary.' Mr. Strauss is the revolutionary who is more revolutionary than the Russian revolutionaries, and, though internal in his evidence, applies some external test of his own to his anatomy of the social history of Soviet Russia. Dr. Taracouzio writes a learned documentary, detached only as an academic thesis is so, but inevitably biased against Soviet diplomacy because of 'the Communist dogma.' Only Mr. Murphy pays the Soviets the compliment of judging their foreign policy according to their own view of history, because though he is a member of the Labour Party he also happens to be a Marxist.

What precisely is the basis of Soviet diplomacy?

There is an apt maxim of Marx which Mr. Murphy quotes in answer:

Man makes his own history, but he does not make it out of the whole cloth; he does not make it out of the conditions chosen by himself but out of such as he finds close at hand.

It is in the light of such a proposition 'adopted by the Russians' that the 'riddle' of Soviet diplomacy can be explained; it is only through such a view of the concrete realities of the world situation, and of the relations of social and political forces, that the 'enigma' of the Kremlin ceases to be enigmatic.

There have been two different worlds since 1917, the old Capitalist world, and the world of Russia where the first experiment of a socialist society was tried out. The Bolsheviks believed that these two worlds could and would co-exist until the contradictions of the old society inevitably led the peoples of other countries to take their destinies into their own hands. Those in the old world who imagined

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a threat to themselves in the very existence of Bolshevism, however, have always seen a complete justification for a concentration of capitalist forces to nip Russia in the bud.

Intensely aware of this, the Soviet leaders, who had a new world to build, and wanted peace to build it in, adopted a strategy by which they could consolidate power, develop socialist economy and a defensive army. Time was the essence of this strategy, in view of the open conspiracy of the Fascist anti-comintern front and of reactionary Western manoeuvres. Their own enlightened will and the progressive movements of the world, interested in their own social emancipation, were their allies. They recommended total disarmament to the world powers, they urged collective security against Fascism, they proposed conferences to check aggression and signed various non-aggression pacts. . . . The war which the Soviets thus tried to prevent has come to them, nevertheless, as they knew it would come, for they had seen the dice loaded against them.

The question which all these books (written before June 22, except for Mr. Victor Gollancz's pamphlet) ask by implication is whether that part of Soviet strategy which was its foreign policy succeeded or failed?

Mr. Strauss's judgment is so perverted by his bias against the Soviet rulers that in a postscript, added after June 22, he frankly admits that his forecast of the internal corrosion of the Soviet state, 'due to the growth of privilege at home and utter lack of principles in international affairs . . . has been out-distanced by the course of events.' The Taracouzio compilation was 'neutral' anyhow: I agree with its publisher's blurb that it is 'revealing,' but I cannot say that it is

'stimulating.' Mr. Gollancz's polemics and Mr. Murphy's prophecy about the inevitability of the Russo-German conflict are of value, because the postulates behind Mr. Gollancz's criticism of the Soviet pact with the Nazis and Mr. Murphy's interpretation of Russia's orientation, as being essentially an orientation to itself, and to the concrete elements of the world situation, are of permanent standing. Neither of them is likely to change the content of his world view, though both being socialists they agree about the present contingency: 'All possible aid to the Soviet Union'—these words form the whole of the first chapter of *Russia and Ourselves*; they are the burden of the postscript which Mr. Murphy added to his book after Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union.

MULK RAJ ANAND.

A CAMPAIGN AGAINST CRUELTY

The humane work carried on by Major Van der Byl against cruel methods of trapping wild animals for fur will be known to readers of THE FORTNIGHTLY. This work and the writings and lectures of Grey Owl first awakened public opinion to the cruelties of present trapping methods, with their indiscriminate destruction of wild life. Major Van der Byl has described how his crusade started as a result of a photograph he saw of a fox in a steel trap, frozen to death. From this began a nation-wide propaganda against the use of steel traps and snares. To-day, with many competing claims of war-time charities, readers of THE FORTNIGHTLY are asked not to overlook this most deserving of causes. Donations should be addressed to Major C. Van der Byl, Wappenham House, Towcester, Northants.

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